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ARTIFICIAL GRASSROOTS ADVOCACY AND THE CONSTITUTIONALITY 
OF LEGISLATIVE IDENTIFICATION AND CONTROL MEASURES  
JONATHAN C. ZELLNER 
Modern lobbying is rife with campaigns that claim to be the fruit of 
spur-of-the-moment grassroots activity.  Despite their outward 
appearance, these campaigns mask the fact that their sponsors include 
special interest groups, large corporations, and affluent individuals.  They 
likewise strive to further the objectives of these entities and individuals 
while purporting to promote the public interest.  Because the parties 
behind these pseudo-grassroots efforts enjoy vast financial and political 
resources, their activities have exerted a significant effect on public 
opinion and on the decisions of elected officials.  In recent years, Congress 
has sought to rein in the architects of so-called “Astroturf” lobbying 
through proposed registration, reporting, and disclosure requirements.  
Nevertheless, concerns over the First Amendment ramifications of such 
legislation have thwarted its passage.  
This Note begins by considering the First Amendment-based 
arguments of those who oppose legislative efforts to address Astroturf 
lobbying.  It thereafter examines case law on lobbying disclosure rules, 
and on similar rules in the area of election-related speech, and finds that, 
despite the above arguments, the government has a compelling interest in 
the disclosure of Astroturf lobbying activities.  Finally, this Note analyzes 
the components of the Senate’s most recent disclosure proposal and 
discusses ways by which Congress could strengthen subsequent proposals. 
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ARTIFICIAL GRASSROOTS ADVOCACY AND THE CONSTITUTIONALITY 
OF LEGISLATIVE IDENTIFICATION AND CONTROL MEASURES  
JONATHAN C. ZELLNER* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
For many United States citizens and citizen-groups, grassroots 
advocacy represents an essential medium through which they may exercise 
their First Amendment freedoms of speech, petition, association, and the 
press.  Grassroots efforts inform elected leaders of where constituents 
stand on proposed government action, or lack thereof, thus enabling 
individuals and coalitions to contribute to the public discourse on issues of 
importance.1  But while a common notion of grassroots advocacy may be 
of small community rallies or demonstrations, in reality, many advocates 
are persons and alliances with the ability to raise or spend prodigious sums 
to convey their message—in effect, parties more appropriately described as 
“grassroots lobbyists.”  This may in part explain the recent observation that 
“grassroots advocacy . . . is booming.”2 
With expensive grassroots lobbying campaigns, however, comes the 
issue of authenticity.  Many examples of such campaigns from recent years 
illustrate that they often are not the kind of genuine spontaneous activity 
indicative of grassroots advocacy.  In 2002, with revenue of over $25 
million, the United Seniors Association (USA) ran a multi-million-dollar 
advertising campaign to influence the outcomes of congressional races in 
favor of candidates who backed Medicare prescription drug legislation that 
the Pharmaceutical Research Manufacturers of America (PhRMA) 
similarly supported.3  USA claimed it had a nationwide activist network of 
                                                                                                                          
* Hamilton College, B.A. 2008; University of Connecticut School of Law, J.D. Candidate 2011.  
I would like to thank Professor Leslie Levin for her suggestions and guidance throughout the writing 
process.  I would also like to thank the staffs of Volumes 42 and 43 of the Connecticut Law Review for 
their hard work and encouragement.  This Note is dedicated to my parents, brother, and grandparents 
for their everlasting love, wisdom, and support.  Any and all errors herein are mine and mine alone.  
1 See Jay Alan Sekulow & Erik M. Zimmerman, Weeding Them Out by the Roots: The 
Unconstitutionality of Regulating Grassroots Issue Advocacy, 19 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 164, 197 
(2008) (“Through grassroots issue advocacy, average citizens—and the organizations that they 
support—are able to inform public officials of their support for government action that they believe 
will be beneficial and of their opposition to government action that they believe will be detrimental.”). 
2 Jim Snyder, Town Halls Underscore Grassroots Secrecy, Critics Say, THE HILL, Aug. 10, 2009, 
available at http://thehill.com/business-a-lobbying/54149-town-halls-underscore-grassroots-secrecy-
critics-say.  While it is difficult to estimate how much grassroots lobbyists spend—since there is no 
federal requirement for them to divulge their expenses—some think it may be greater than the $3 
billion spent on direct lobbying.  Id.   
3 PUB. CITIZEN, ORGANIZING ASTROTURF: EVIDENCE SHOWS BOGUS GRASSROOTS GROUPS 
HIJACK THE POLITICAL DEBATE; NEED FOR GRASSROOTS LOBBYING DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS 7 
(2007), available at http://www.cleanupwashington.org/documents/astroturf.pdf. 
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1.5 million, but copies of its tax filings showed that it received more than 
$20 million from one donor in 2002.4  Moreover, PhRMA itself rendered 
monetary assistance to USA that same year; a spokesman for the trade 
association stated that it had given USA an “unrestricted educational 
grant.”5  Three years earlier, the company Century Strategies had run a 
grassroots campaign—with “call-to-action phone calls,” targeted mail, 
rallies, and petitions—to arouse public opposition to pro-gambling 
measures in Mississippi.6  It received its $4 million in funding, though, 
from a group of Mississippi Choctaw who operated a casino and wanted to 
suppress competition.7    
More recent advocacy events have likewise shown an apparent lack of 
spontaneous organization, most notably some of the early “Tea Party” 
protests.  Following CNBC pundit Rick Santelli’s call, in February 2009, 
for a “‘Chicago Tea Party’” to oppose President Obama’s mortgage bailout 
plan, numerous websites dedicated to the cause sprang to life, each 
supposedly part of a national grassroots Internet protest and each tied to the 
Sam Adams Alliance advocacy group.8  This group in turn enjoyed 
substantial financial support from the Koch family, multibillionaire owners 
of one of the largest privately-held corporations in the United States, and 
FreedomWorks, a public relations firm with former House Majority leader 
Dick Armey as its chairman, and which the Kochs have funded.9  
Additionally, certain backers of President Obama’s healthcare plan may 
themselves have engaged in similar behavior.  Organizing for America, the 
Service Employees International Union, and Health Care for America 
Now, staunch promoters of the plan, allegedly urged hordes of their 
                                                                                                                          
4 Id. 
5 Id. 
6 S. COMM. ON INDIAN AFFAIRS, 109TH CONG., “GIMME FIVE”—INVESTIGATION OF TRIBAL 
LOBBYING MATTERS 24–26 [hereinafter “GIMME FIVE”], available at 
http://www.indian.senate.gov/public/_files/Report.pdf. 
7 PUB. CITIZEN, supra note 3, at 5.  The Choctaw tribe was a client of now-convicted lobbyist 
Jack Abramoff, who, in addition to coordinating the anti-gambling campaign, ultimately received a 
large percentage of the Choctaws’ funds for use in entities he controlled as well as pet projects.  
“GIMME FIVE,” supra note 6, at 34–38. 
8 Mark Ames & Yasha Levine, The Rick Santelli “Tea Party” Controversy: Article Kicks Up a 
Media Dust Storm, ALTERNET (Mar. 3, 2009), http://www.alternet.org/module/printversion/129656.   
9 See Paul Krugman, Op-Ed., Tea Parties Forever, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 12, 2009, at A21 (“In 
particular, a key role is being played by FreedomWorks, an organization run by Richard Armey, the 
former House majority leader . . . .”); Ames & Levine, supra note 8 (arguing that the Tea Parties were 
mostly a “sophisticated PR campaign” for the Koch family, and that the Sam Adams Alliance “took 
pains to scrub . . . deep links to . . . Koch family money”).  One of the Kochs later appeared to take 
credit for helping to kick-start the protests.  See David Weigel, Tea Party Patrons Point New Recruits 
Toward 2010, WASH. INDEP. (Oct. 5, 2009, 12:27 AM), http://washingtonindependent.com/62318/tea-
party-patrons-point-new-recruits-toward-2010 (noting that, at an Americans for Prosperity-sponsored 
summit, David Koch “took credit for launching [Americans for Prosperity],” which, like 
FreedomWorks, played a major role in “shepherding the Tea Parties”). 
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supporters to rally against the Parties,10 suggesting that some of the 
counterprotests were not organic grassroots activity either.  
The above examples highlight a phenomenon more widely known as 
“Astroturfing,” or fake grassroots advocacy, a practice that has become 
popular among particular groups and individuals.  In short, Astroturfing 
refers to the efforts of paid lobbyists to conduct a political or public 
relations campaign on behalf of a client, typically an interest group, 
designed in such a way as to mask its origins and create the impression that 
it is spur-of-the-moment grassroots behavior.11  Despite its apparent 
popularity, however, Astroturfing retains questionable characteristics.  As 
the illustrations suggest, it relies heavily on misrepresentation, and in many 
cases does not advance the interests of the general public.  Distinguishing 
this form of advocacy from the more traditional bottom-up form, though, 
can be challenging where the law essentially allows Astroturfers to conduct 
their activities alongside genuine issue advocates, as it presently does, 
without requiring at least some degree of accountability.12   
This Note contends that Congress needs to act to expose and control 
Astroturf lobbying, and that it can without stifling the First Amendment 
rights of everyday issue advocates.  Part II describes the tactics of 
Astroturfing at greater length, expanding on the above-mentioned 
problematic aspects of the practice.  From there, it lays out the primary 
First Amendment-based arguments against legislative efforts to expose and 
control Astroturfing.  Part III introduces United States v. Harriss,13 in 
which the Supreme Court upheld grassroots lobbying disclosure laws as a 
means of addressing fake grassroots lobbying, and argues that the 
government has a compelling interest in combating Astroturfing through 
such laws.  In doing so, Part III finds that such laws do not, or will not, 
substantially encroach on or eviscerate the First Amendment rights of true 
grassroots issue advocates, as critics of reform claim.  Part III likewise 
asserts that employing disclosure laws to address Astroturfing is consistent 
with the aims of the “marketplace of ideas” concept—chiefly that of open, 
transparent public discourse—as illustrated by analogous disclosure 
provisions in the realm of election-related speech.  Finally, Part IV 
analyzes potential registration, reporting, and disclosure solutions, 
observing that requirements of the kind Congress proposed in 2007 serve 
as a practical starting place for the laws that should take effect. 
                                                                                                                          
10 Dan Eggen & Philip Rucker, Loose Network of Activists Drives Reform Opposition, WASH. 
POST, Aug. 16, 2009, at A01; Ryan Sager, Op-Ed., Keep Off the Astroturf, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 19, 2009, 
at A27. 
11 See Part II.A.1 infra, for a fuller discussion of the term “Astroturfing.”  
12 As Part II.A.2 infra argues, current federal lobbying laws do little to capture the activities of 
Astroturf lobbyists. 
13 347 U.S. 612 (1954). 
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II.  ASTROTURF LOBBYING AND FIRST AMENDMENT CONCERNS OVER 
LEGISLATIVE EFFORTS TO EXPOSE AND CONTROL IT 
Artificial grassroots advocacy is not novel.  Courts and elected leaders 
alike have been aware of it for some time.  Part A expands on the 
description of Astroturfing, tracing the origin of its name and discussing 
the tactics of the practice.  Part B then sets forth critical objections to 
legislative efforts to address Astroturfing, including the contention that 
such efforts will ultimately chill the activity of true grassroots advocates 
and thus interfere considerably with their First Amendment liberties. 
A.  Origins, Characteristics, and Treatment of “Astroturfing”     
1.  Term Origins and Practice Techniques 
The forerunners to present-day Astroturfing existed in the United 
States at least as early as World War I.14  By the time the Supreme Court 
decided United States v. Harriss15 in the middle of the twentieth century, it 
understood the activity which constitutes Astroturfing.  The use of the term 
“Astroturfing” to describe this type of activity, however, would not come 
into existence until the mid-1980s.  Former Texas Senator Lloyd Bentsen 
appears responsible for first uttering the term.  In 1985, describing a 
“‘mountain of cards and letters’” he received promoting what looked like 
positions reflecting the interests of insurance companies, the Senator 
remarked, “‘A fellow from Texas can tell the difference between grass 
roots and Astroturf. . . .  [T]his is generated mail.’”16  Senator Bentsen was 
referring to AstroTurf, the synthetic grass-like substance used as surface 
material for playing fields.  
Parties that engage in Astroturfing attempt to give officials the 
impression that significant public support for or opposition to a stance on a 
political issue exists when, in actuality, such concern may be lacking 
altogether.17  Because Astroturf efforts seek to pose as spontaneous 
grassroots movements, though, they do not necessarily depend on whether 
citizen activists have already spoken out in favor of or against proposed 
                                                                                                                          
14 See Kathy R. Fitzpatrick & Michael J. Palenchar, Disclosing Special Interests: Constitutional 
Restrictions on Front Groups, 18 J. PUB. REL. RES. 203, 206 (2006) (noting that the “modern history of 
front groups”—entities commonly employed in Astroturf lobbying—traces to approximately 1913). 
15 347 U.S. 612 (1954). 
16 Sager, supra note 10. 
17 See, e.g., Anita S. Krishnakumar, Towards a Madisonian, Interest-Group-Based, Approach to 
Lobbying Regulation, 58 ALA. L. REV. 513, 565 n.205 (2007) (“The term ‘astroturf’ lobbying was 
coined to describe lobbyist efforts to orchestrate a fake, or less than completely accurate, showing of 
citizen support for a particular policy position, at the grassroots level . . . .”); Gary Weiss, Astroturfing 
Congress, FORBES.COM (Feb. 13, 2007, 6:00 AM), http://www.forbes.com/2007/02/12/muckraker-
astroturf-congress-opinion-cx_gw_0213muckraker_print.html (“The aim [of Astroturfing] is simple: to 
deceive Congress and regulatory agencies into believing that there is a groundswell of public concern 
about their pet issues.”). 
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government action.18  In other words, Astroturf lobbying seeks to 
“manufacture” support for the views it expresses, regardless of whether 
citizens already support those positions.19  This generally involves 
mimicking the characteristics of grassroots advocacy by adopting the 
strategies that smaller, constituent-led grassroots campaigns employ, 
including letters to elected leaders, phone calls, and mass e-mails.20   
For the most part, the persons and coalitions behind Astroturf 
movements are not everyday citizens or entities with modest financial 
resources and limited political connections.  Rather, the architects of these 
campaigns, and their clients, include powerful individuals and special 
interest groups with the ability to raise or contribute copious amounts of 
money, and who enjoy strong ties with influential political figures.21  In 
addition, to disguise their identities, the persons and entities who engage in 
Astroturfing create separate coalitions and front groups that conduct the 
actual lobbying.22  This lobbying frequently consists of advertising the 
client’s positions and persuading constituents to telephone or write their 
representatives in support of these positions.23  Astroturf lobbying may also 
consist of an organization or a special interest group dispatching paid 
agents to publicly pose as “‘concerned citizens.’”24   
Because of these tendencies, Astroturf lobbying strives to encourage 
constituents and politicians to support positions which reflect the interests 
of large corporations, trade organizations, and affluent individuals—
interests which the public at large may not necessarily share.25  The United 
                                                                                                                          
18 See, e.g., Ramón Castellblanch, Challenging Pharmaceutical Industry Political Power in 
Maine and Vermont, 28 J. HEALTH POL., POL’Y & L. 109, 126 (2003) (explaining that Astroturf 
operations “mimic grassroots lobbying” and that Astroturf lobbyists “[do not use] public opinion . . . as 
they find it”).   
19 See Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer, What Is This “Lobbying” That We Are So Worried About?, 26 YALE 
L. & POL’Y REV. 485, 559 (2008) (noting that Astroturf lobbying involves “[the generation of] fake or 
at least short-lived and shallow public support for its position”). 
20 See, e.g., Castellblanch, supra note 18, at 126 (“Astroturf lobbying is the top-down fabrication 
of the outpourings of letters, faxes, e-mails, phone calls, and personal visits characteristic of bottom-up 
grassroots campaigns.”); Weiss, supra note 17 (“Like genuine grass-roots groups, Astroturf 
organizations bring forth a blizzard of letters, phone calls and e-mails.”). 
21 PUB. CITIZEN, supra note 3, at 1–2; see also Gary D. Bass, Citizens Have a Right To Know 
About Lobbying Efforts, ROLL CALL, May 16, 2007, available at http://www.ombwatch.org/ 
files/npadv/gbassopedrollcall05162007.pdf (noting that “phony ‘grass-roots’ organizations . . . are 
really front groups for private, wealthy interests”). 
22 Press Release, OMB Watch, Distortions and Misinformation Continue to Abound in Grassroots 
Lobbying Disclosure Debate (Mar. 7, 2007), http://www.ombwatch.org/print/3203. 
23 Krishnakumar, supra note 17, at 565 n.205. 
24 Tamara R. Piety, Against Freedom of Commercial Expression, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 2583, 
2659 n.341 (2008) (citing JOHN C. STAUBER & SHELDON RAMPTON, TOXIC SLUDGE IS GOOD FOR YOU 
79 (1995)). 
25 See PUB. CITIZEN, supra note 3, at 1 (arguing that the parties behind Astroturf movements have 
little in common with the ordinary citizens they claim to represent); see also Ann Bartow, Book 
Review, 5 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 449, 459–60 (2007) (reviewing YOCHAI BENKLER, THE 
WEALTH OF NETWORKS: HOW SOCIAL PRODUCTION TRANSFORMS MARKETS AND FREEDOM (2006)) 
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Seniors Association and Century Strategies, for instance, sought to (and 
did) build support for positions that advanced the goals of the 
pharmaceutical industry and a casino operator.26  On some occasions, 
though, even nonprofit organizations—such as Planned Parenthood—
resort to Astroturfing to accomplish certain aims.  The New York Times 
reported in 2003 that one branch of Planned Parenthood disseminated form 
letters to editors at publications throughout the country “that look[ed] like 
authentic grass-roots responses from readers but [were] not.”27  The 
organization’s Web site featured pre-made letters and urged visitors to 
combine segments of the letters and to send the newly-created documents 
to publications.28   
To build support for their messages, Astroturfers must instill in citizens 
the belief that their activities represent genuine grassroots efforts.  To 
facilitate trust, they sometimes give the front groups and affiliated alliances 
they create innocuous-sounding names which do not seem to reflect any 
particular position.  The lobbyists for PhRMA did this in creating the 
United Seniors Association.  In other instances, however, Astroturf 
lobbyists resort to more overt misrepresentation, operating under names 
that suggest the opposite of the group’s intended goals.  One such group, 
the Save Our Species Alliance (SOSA), campaigned in 2005 in favor of a 
House bill that, if adopted, would have removed provisions of the 
Endangered Species Act mandating preservation of habitat areas for 
endangered species.29  SOSA’s executive director and head lobbyist had 
longstanding connections with the timber industry.30  Similarly, Project 
Protect, a group which lobbied in support of the Healthy Forests 
Restoration Act of 2003—a law calling for the thinning of fire-prone 
forests in Western states to combat conflagrations, and which authorizes 
the removal of larger, commercially valuable trees instead of just 
vulnerable brush and undergrowth31—served as a front group for loggers.32 
As a result, many costly Astroturf campaigns have proven effective in 
                                                                                                                          
(“[Astroturfing] is a corrupting influence on open and honest debate.”); Weiss, supra note 17 
(“Astroturf groups have a corrosive effect on public opinion.”). 
26 See supra notes 3–7 and accompanying text; “GIMME FIVE,” supra note 6, at 10; Barbara T. 
Dreyfuss, Poison Pill: How Abramoff’s Cronies Sold the Medicare Drug Bill, WASH. MONTHLY, Nov. 
2006, at 23, 26–29. 
27 Jennifer 8. Lee, Editors and Lobbyists Wage High-Tech War over Letters, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 27, 
2003, at C10. 
28 Id. 
29 PUB. CITIZEN, supra note 3, at 7. 
30 Weiss, supra note 17. 
31 See Wildfires in Western Forests, NAT. RES. DEF. COUNCIL, http://www.nrdc.org/ 
land/forests/pfires.asp (last visited Sept. 30, 2010) (observing that the legislation was “a codeword for 
commercial exploitation”).  
32 See PUB. CITIZEN, supra note 3, at 6–7 (noting that, in 2004, Project Protect listed an address 
that matched that of the American Forest Resource Council, a lobbying group for pro-industry land 
management policies, and that Project Protect’s organizer later participated in the SOSA campaign). 
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influencing public opinion.  In the 1990s, health insurance companies spent 
$17 million on televised advertisements opposing President Clinton’s plan 
for national healthcare reform, which they filtered through front groups.33  
The advertisements marshaled opposition to the plan and ultimately helped 
defeat it.34  Similarly, during the 2000 election cycle, Citizens for Better 
Medicare, a pharmaceutical-industry front group, spent $65 million on 
issue advertisements in a successful attempt to prevent Congress from 
enacting Medicare drug benefit reform.35  The advertisements suggested 
that legislation could amount to “‘big government in [your] medicine 
cabinet’” and urged the public to “‘[l]et Congress know you support the 
right Medicare reforms.’”36  Furthermore, in the early 1990s, a large public 
relations firm, with funding from the Kuwaiti government, created a front 
group that drummed up considerable support for U.S. military intervention 
in the Persian Gulf following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.37  
2.  Organizational and Legislative Treatment of Astroturf Lobbying  
Public relations organizations view Astroturfing as a practice in which 
their members should not participate.  The Public Relations Society of 
America (PRSA) states in its code of ethics that its members must “[b]e 
honest and accurate in all communications,” “[r]eveal the sponsors for 
causes and interests represented,” and “[a]void deceptive practices.”38  
PRSA’s code also lists as improper conduct instances where a member 
“implements ‘grass roots’ campaigns or letter-writing campaigns to 
legislators on behalf of undisclosed interest groups” or “deceives the public 
by employing people to pose as volunteers to speak at public hearings and 
participate in ‘grass roots’ campaigns.”39  The International Public 
Relations Association (IPRA) likewise states in its code of ethics that its 
members “[shall n]ot create any organization to serve an announced cause 
but which actually serves an undisclosed [special or private] interest.”40  
And although the Public Affairs Council has no official codified position 
                                                                                                                          
33 Weiss, supra note 17. 
34 STAUBER & RAMPTON, supra note 24, at 97–98; Fitzpatrick & Palenchar, supra note 14, at 209; 
Weiss, supra note 17.   
35 Vicky Lankarge, Denying Coverage Before the Fact, MARKET WATCH (July 26, 2001, 1:52 
PM), http://www.Marketwatch.com/story/story/print?guid=0AA2F523-0CE2-4EED-8477-
0B0F6A2E3366; PUB. CITIZEN, supra note 3, at 6. 
36 Robert Pear, Drug Company Ads Attack Medicare Coverage of Drugs, N.Y. TIMES, July 29, 
1999, at A18. 
37 STAUBER & RAMPTON, supra note 24, at 167–71.  Kuwait’s government allegedly funded as 
many as twenty public relations firms and lobbying groups to generate support for the use of force 
against Iraq.  Id. at 169.  
38 Code of Ethics, PUB. RELATIONS SOC’Y AM. (2000), http://www.prsa.org/AboutPRSA/ 
Ethics/CodeEnglish/.   
39 Id. 
40 Code of Venice, INT’L PUB. RELATIONS ASS’N (2009), http://www.ipra.org/detail.asp? 
articleid=21.  IPRA’s code also states that members must give “a faithful representation” of the 
organizations they serve.  Id.  
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on Astroturfing, it has discouraged the use of the practice, noting that the 
grassroots community frowns upon it.41  In addition, some states and 
municipalities have formally prohibited lobbyists from creating the false 
appearance of public support for (or opposition to) particular government 
action.42   
But while certain organizations, states, and cities have taken steps to 
dissuade lobbyists from employing pseudo-grassroots techniques in their 
advocacy efforts, the federal government has not approached the matter as 
proactively.  Federal lobbying laws, in particular the amended Lobbying 
Disclosure Act of 1995,43 govern the registration of lobbyists, the reporting 
of direct lobbying activities, and the disclosure of contributors.  Yet, they 
do not mandate that grassroots lobbyists register with the government, 
disclose who contributes to their campaigns and in what amounts, or report 
how much they spend and on what activities44—thus availing Astroturfers 
of the benefits of exemption.  Those who strictly engage in efforts to 
stimulate grassroots advocacy can hence avoid disclosure regardless of the 
extent of their “‘grassroots lobbying’” activities and regardless of the 
amount of funding or compensation they obtain to carry out their 
activities.45  Although drafts of the Lobbying Disclosure Act featured 
provisions requiring registration of Astroturf lobbyists and reports on their 
actions and contributors, the drafting committee did not include them in the 
final bill.46  In 2007, Congress again considered implementing registration 
and reporting standards for grassroots lobbyists—as part of the Senate’s 
proposed Lobbying Transparency and Accountability Act of 2007.47  
Again, however, the bill enacted into law contained no sections on 
                                                                                                                          
41 Fitzpatrick & Palenchar, supra note 14, at 221.  The Public Affairs Council official in charge of 
grassroots efforts adds that lobbyists who resort to Astroturfing hurt their ability to forge working 
relationships with lawmakers.  Id. 
42 Vincent R. Johnson, Regulating Lobbyists: Law, Ethics, and Public Policy, 16 CORNELL J.L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 1, 21 (2006). 
43 Pub. L. No. 104-65, 109 Stat. 691 (1995) (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. §§ 1601–12 (2006) 
(amended 2007). 
44 Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995, 2 U.S.C. §§ 1602–04 (2006); see also Jill E. Fisch, How Do 
Corporations Play Politics?: The FedEx Story, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1495, 1564 (2005) (observing that 
existing laws do not require the disclosure of efforts to generate grassroots lobbying activity); Jim 
Drinkard, Lawmakers Move To Cut Lobbyists’ Influence, USA TODAY, Jan. 12, 2006, at 6A (same);  
see also Meredith McGehee, Lobby Reform as Window Dressing, 31 ADMIN. & REG. L. NEWS 4, 4 
(2006) (citing the Jack Abramoff lobbying scandal for the observation that, if certain advocacy conduct 
qualifies as grassroots lobbying, the possibility exists for “expenditures in the millions [to go] 
undisclosed to the American people”). 
45 JACK MASKELL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 33794, GRASSROOTS LOBBYING: 
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS 1–2 (2007). 
46 Senator Carl Levin (D-Mich.) testified before a House committee that, by the time of the bill’s 
passage, “[e]very reference to grass roots lobbying—and even to paid efforts to stimulate artificial 
grass roots lobbying—[had] been deleted.”  Overhauling the Lobbying Disclosure Laws: Hearing 
Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary on the Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995, 104th Cong. (1995) 
(testimony of Sen. Levin). 
47 S. 1, 110th Cong. § 220 (2007). 
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grassroots lobbying; a floor amendment, introduced due to concerns over 
the potential reach of the grassroots lobbying provisions, resulted in their 
excision.48  
Without registration, reporting, and disclosure requirements, persons 
and entities to whom current lobbying laws would otherwise apply can 
continue to evade them by posing as issue advocates, limiting what the 
public may learn about them and their activities.  For those who oppose 
attempts to address Astroturfing through grassroots lobbying legislation, 
however, the above results protect grassroots activists from governmental 
intrusions into their First Amendment liberties and their ability to freely 
advocate.  As the following text shows, critics of grassroots lobbying laws 
have presented a host of reasons relating to speech, petition, association, 
and press concerns for why, from their perspective, such laws are 
unconstitutional.       
B.  Arguments Against Legislative Efforts To Identify and Control 
Astroturf Lobbying 
1.  Statutory Overbreadth and the Chilling Effect of Legislation on 
First Amendment Rights 
Critics of legislative efforts to shine light on Astroturf lobbying have 
argued that grassroots lobbying laws are, or will be, overbroad.  While 
federal statutes designed to address Astroturfing may achieve the desired 
goal of exposing sham grassroots campaigns, opponents believe that they 
will also draw within their scope genuine issue advocates.  After the Senate 
removed the grassroots lobbying sections of the Lobbying Transparency 
and Accountability Act, former Representatives Christopher Shays and 
Marty Meehan introduced a House bill providing for the reporting of 
Astroturfing.49  The bill mandated that lobbyists who engaged in “‘paid 
communications campaigns to influence the general public to lobby 
Congress’” were to report lobbying expenditures in excess of $100,000 
over a three-month interval and income from clients exceeding $50,000 
during the same period.50  Critics have opined that, under a scheme such as 
this, grassroots activists could trigger disclosure simply by spending the 
requisite amount of money within the specified timeframe.51  Some have 
claimed that this could occur without engagement in substantial lobbying 
                                                                                                                          
48 William V. Luneburg & A.L. Spitzer, The Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995: Scope of 
Coverage, in THE LOBBYING MANUAL 43, 59 (William V. Luneburg et al. eds., 4th ed. 2009); Thomas 
M. Susman & William V. Luneburg, History of Lobbying Disclosure Reform Proposals Since 1955, in 
THE LOBBYING MANUAL, supra, at 23, 36. 
49 H.R. 2093, 110th Cong. (2007). 
50 Id. § 1(b)(2)(A)(iii), (d)(1)(C); Tory Newmyer, Grass-Roots Lobby Disclosure Draws Fire, 
ROLL CALL, May 2, 2007, available at http://www.rollcall.com/issues/52_118/lobbying/18273-1.html. 
51 Sekulow & Zimmerman, supra note 1, at 174. 
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activities, such as through an issue advertisement campaign designed to 
alert citizens to prospective government action.52 
Of greater concern regarding possibly overbroad legislation, though, is 
the potential consequence of provisions stipulating that parties who engage 
in grassroots lobbying report the sources from which they derive financial 
or logistical support.  Legislation opponents have maintained that the 
disclosure aspects of the House-proposed Honest Leadership and Open 
Government Act of 2006, which were identical to those of the Lobbying 
Transparency and Accountability Act, contained language sufficiently 
broad to sweep everyday issue advocates within the bill’s reach.53  
Allegedly, any person or group that “‘voluntarily’ communicates [its] 
views on any ‘issue’ to any ‘[f]ederal official,’” or “‘encourages other 
members of the general public to do the same’” would have needed to 
register with the government and to disclose the identities of its 
contributors.54  Accordingly, critics assert, these kinds of statutory 
provisions could result in a chilling effect on the First Amendment rights 
of issue advocates in one of two ways.  For groups that espouse unpopular 
or inflammatory opinions, revealing their identities to the public could 
ostracize them from their fellow constituents.55  It could also result in 
reprisal from powerful officials who take offense to these views.56  But 
even if their ideologies are not especially divisive, grassroots campaigners 
may incur criminal sanctions for failure to report funding—if such 
penalties attach for noncompliance.57  In either case, opponents of 
grassroots lobbying legislation attest that issue advocates may find it best 
to refrain from advocacy entirely.58 
                                                                                                                          
52 See Caroline Fredrickson & Douglas Johnson, Citizens Don’t Need “Protection” from 
Lobbying, ROLL CALL, May 10, 2007, available at http://www.nrlc.org/freespeech/ 
RollCallFredricksonJohnson.html (arguing that grassroots advocates could spend more than $100,000 
in less than three months via several full-page newspaper advertisements or a small campaign aimed at 
arousing public awareness, in even a small number of districts, of an upcoming congressional vote). 
53 FREE SPEECH COAL., INC., THE UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF CONGRESSIONAL REGULATION OF 
GRASSROOTS LOBBYING 1, 4 (2007), available at http://www.freespeechcoalition.org/pdfs/ 
FSCGrassrootsLobbying2.pdf. 
54 See id. at 3–4 (quoting a bill that the House of Representatives introduced to identify paid 
efforts to encourage grassroots activity). 
55 Abraham Lincoln Found. et al., Coalition Letter to Members of the Subcommittee on the 
Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties Urging the Opposition to Efforts To Regulate Grassroots 
Lobbying (Feb. 28, 2007) [hereinafter Coalition Letter], http://www.aclu.org/print/free-speech/ 
coalition-letter-members-subcommittee-constitution-civil-rights-and-civil-liberties-urgi. 
56 Fredrickson & Johnson, supra note 52. 
57 See ACLU, ACLU Letter to the Senate Urging Support of the Bennett Amendment to Senate 
Bill 1 (Jan. 17, 2007) [hereinafter ACLU Letter], http://www.aclu.org/print/free-speech/aclu-letter-
senate-urging-support-bennett-amendment-senate-bill-1. 
58 E.g., Coalition Letter, supra note 55; ACLU Letter, supra note 57; see also Ron Smith, 
Compelled Cost Disclosure of Grass Roots Lobbying Expenses: Necessary Government Voyeurism or 
Chilled Political Speech?, 6 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 115, 117 (1996) (arguing that grassroots 
disclosure laws may render it difficult for citizens “to discuss government issues with public officials 
without fear of being hauled into court . . . or fined for attempts to otherwise peacefully and lawfully 
influence [government] officials”). 
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Because of this supposed capacity for silencing issue advocates, critics 
argue that grassroots lobbying legislation cannot withstand the close 
scrutiny with which courts review laws that infringe on, or may infringe 
on, the exercise of political expression.59  The Supreme Court has noted 
that, “[w]hen a law burdens core political speech,” it must be “narrowly 
tailored to serve an overriding [governmental] interest” to survive.60  In 
this respect, the Court has suggested that laws that significantly burden 
issue advocacy may not stand in the absence of a compelling governmental 
interest, because such activities are inherently political and implicate the 
First Amendment speech, association, press, and petition rights of 
advocates.61   
In Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, 
Inc., the Supreme Court considered a claim that the advocacy actions of 
several railroad companies breached the Sherman Antitrust Act’s anti-
trade-monopolization provisions,62 violations of which were punishable by 
fine, imprisonment, or both.63  The activity at issue in Noerr involved a 
publicity campaign that railroad companies initiated to stifle competition 
from the motor freight industry, the contents of which “[were] made to 
appear as spontaneously expressed views of independent persons and civic 
groups.”64  The Court did not find the statute unconstitutional with respect 
to the defendants’ actions, but it did hold that “no violation of the Act 
[could] be predicated upon mere attempts to influence the passage or 
enforcement of laws.”65  While the defendants’ campaign may have hurt 
the business of the plaintiff truckers, the Court noted that efforts to 
influence legislation may inevitably inflict some injury on the interests of 
the party against whom they are directed.66  Thus the Court found that, 
under “close scrutiny,” it could not apply the Sherman Act to the 
                                                                                                                          
59 See Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 420 (1988) (observing that “a limitation on political 
expression [is] subject to exacting scrutiny”). 
60 McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 347 (1995) (quoting First Nat’l Bank of 
Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 786 (1978)).   
61 See id. at 346–47 (noting that discussion of public issues, the qualifications of political 
candidates, and issue-based elections, among other examples of political expression, receive the 
broadest First Amendment defense); E. R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 
U.S. 127, 137–38 (1961) (suggesting that activities which comprise “mere solicitation of governmental 
action with respect to the passage and enforcement of laws” involve the right of petition); Talley v. 
California, 362 U.S. 60, 64–65 (1960) (finding that laws restricting the ability of “groups engaged in 
the dissemination of ideas” to publish and circulate their ideas would thereby restrict freedom of 
expression); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460–61 (1958) (observing that group 
association promotes effective issue advocacy and that “state action which may have the effect of 
curtailing the freedom to associate is subject to the closest scrutiny”); see also Sekulow & Zimmerman, 
supra note 1, at 165 (“Legislation that regulates or prohibits grassroots issue advocacy violates the First 
Amendment because it is not narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling governmental interest.”). 
62 Noerr, 365 U.S. at 129.  
63 Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–2 (1958). 
64 Noerr, 365 U.S. at 129–30.   
65 Id. at 135. 
66 Id. at 142–44. 
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defendants’ activities, for doing so, and rendering the activities illegal, 
would be equivalent to outlawing them.67 
The same standard of review may apply to laws which indirectly affect 
grassroots activity, such as expenditure-reporting rules.  In Buckley v. 
Valeo,68 the Supreme Court upheld federal restrictions on the size of 
campaign contributions as well as requirements that candidates running for 
office and individual donors who contributed above a certain dollar-
threshold file reports of contributions and expenditures.69  In doing so, the 
Court applied strict scrutiny, or what it referred to as “exacting scrutiny.”70  
The Court noted that it had never before suggested that the dependence of 
a communication on the spending of money reduced the exacting scrutiny 
with which the Court analyzed laws burdening First Amendment rights.71  
It also noted that this standard of review is necessary even where the risk 
of First Amendment encroachment is indirect in nature.72   
Courts have previously ruled against disclosure laws where advocates 
could demonstrate that revelation of certain information would 
substantially deter them from participation in advocacy and other political 
activities, and where this deterrent effect appeared to outweigh the aims of 
disclosure.  In NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, the Supreme Court 
overturned an Alabama state court contempt citation against the NAACP 
for the organization’s failure to disclose membership lists for its Alabama 
branch in order “to do business” in the state.73  The state’s reason for 
seeking disclosure of the membership lists was to determine whether the 
NAACP was conducting intrastate business in Alabama in violation of the 
state’s foreign corporation registration statute.74  The Court found that the 
NAACP had persuasively shown that, on past occasions, disclosure of the 
identities of its members had subjected these individuals to antagonistic 
treatment, including reprisals, loss of employment, threats of violence, and 
“other manifestations of public hostility.”75  From the Court’s perspective, 
compelled disclosure was likely to convince existing members to leave the 
NAACP and to discourage others from joining.  The Court held that 
Alabama’s asserted interest in disclosure did not justify “the deterrent 
                                                                                                                          
67 Id. at 142–45.  
68 424 U.S. 1 (1976). 
69 Id. at 23, 35, 74–75, 82. 
70 Id. at 16, 64–65. 
71 Id. at 16. 
72 See id. at 65 (“This type of scrutiny is necessary even if any deterrent effect on the exercise of 
First Amendment rights arises . . . indirectly as an unintended . . . result of the government’s conduct in 
requiring disclosure.”). 
73 NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 452–54, 467 (1958).  The petitioners did 
not object to divulging the identities of NAACP employees and persons who held official positions 
within the organization, or to Alabama’s interest in acquiring this information, but refused to disclose 
the identities of the organization’s ordinary rank-and-file members.  Id. at 463–64. 
74 Id. at 464.  
75 Id. at 462. 
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effect on the free enjoyment of the right to associate” that would likely 
result from the NAACP having to divulge its membership lists.76  The 
Court reached a similar conclusion two years later in Bates v. City of Little 
Rock, 77 another case involving the NAACP. 
At the state level, the Supreme Court of Montana in Montana 
Automobile Ass’n v. Greely78 invalidated sections of a ballot initiative 
broadening the coverage of Montana’s lobbying act.  The measure added to 
the act’s definition of “‘unprofessional conduct’ . . . ‘[efforts] to influence 
the action of any public official on any measure’” through “‘the promise of 
support or opposition at any future election.’”79  It also required that 
organizations that made annual payments in excess of $1,000 “‘to solicit, 
directly, indirectly or by an advertising campaign, the lobbying efforts of 
another person,’” disclose the amounts spent on lobbying activities.80  The 
measure further required the disclosure of payments for the printing and 
distribution of specific publications.81  The petitioners hinted that 
disclosure would influence some of them to abstain from issue advocacy, 
such as ceasing publication of newsletters.82  The court held that this 
consequence, as well as the court’s finding that the lobbying-activities-
disclosure section was overly vague,83 justified the conclusion that the 
provisions were unconstitutional.84   
2.  Violation of the First Amendment Principle of Anonymity 
An additional, and somewhat related, argument against the use of 
legislative efforts to identify and control Astroturfing implicates the 
alleged constitutional right to speak and publish anonymously.  
Anonymous speech and writing has a long history in the United States; the 
authors of the Constitution “were favorably disposed toward 
pseudonymous authorship,” and anonymous speech and literature were 
                                                                                                                          
76 Id. at 462–63, 466. 
77 361 U.S. 516 (1960).  The Court found that “the municipalities . . . failed to demonstrate a 
controlling justification for the deterrence of free association which compulsory disclosure of the 
membership lists would cause.”  Id. at 527.  The petitioners had cited “‘the anti-NAACP climate in 
[Arkansas]’” as the reason for their refusal to disclose the names of the organization’s members and 
contributors, maintaining that such revelation might lead to harassment, economic reprisals, and even 
bodily harm.  Id. at 520.   
78 632 P.2d 300 (Mont. 1981). 
79 Id. at 304. 
80 Id. at 306, 310. 
81 Id. at 309. 
82 Id.  One example of an organizational action that the initiative indicated would trigger 
disclosure was the “[m]ailing of newsletters by an organized church to members and nonmembers 
encouraging the reader to contact a public official on an abortion law.”  Id. at 306. 
83 Compare id. at 304–05, 307–08 (holding that lobbying statutes may be void for vagueness, and 
that the lobbying-activities-disclosure section was impermissibly vague), with Kimbell v. Hooper, 665 
A.2d 44, 47 (Vt. 1995) (finding that “[l]aws regulating . . . political activities [such as lobbying] in a 
neutral, noncensorial manner will be stricken as overbroad only as a last resort”). 
84 Greely, 632 P.2d at 307–09. 
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common during the Revolutionary War and in the early days of the 
Republic.85  Opponents of grassroots lobbying legislation therefore 
maintain that the Constitution secures for citizens the freedom to speak, 
publish, and advocate anonymously, and that the Supreme Court has 
endorsed this principle by recognizing the interest of citizens in 
safeguarding themselves from ridicule, embarrassment, and retaliation.86  
Opponents likewise contend that the registration and reporting provisions 
of grassroots lobbying legislation, like the suggested amendments to the 
Lobbying Disclosure Act, would hamper the ability of issue advocates “to 
anonymously organize and gather citizen support for a cause.”87 
Decisions such as Patterson and Bates underscore a willingness on the 
part of the Supreme Court to protect anonymity in public fora where a 
legitimate threat of harassment and violence exists.88  This notion of 
protection may also apply to cases where the risk of hostility toward parties 
who wish to remain anonymous is not as evident.  For instance, Talley v. 
California89 involved a Los Angeles city ordinance that required persons 
who publicly circulated handbills within the city to include on the handbill 
their name and address and the names and addresses of the parties who 
sponsored the document.90  The petitioner had disseminated flyers urging 
readers to boycott businesses that carried products from companies that 
would not offer equal employment opportunities to minorities.91  He did 
this without including his name and address on the documents, and 
received a fine as a result.  In reviewing the ordinance, the Court found that 
the identification requirement “would tend to restrict freedom to distribute 
information and thereby freedom of expression,” and cited Patterson and 
Bates for the observation that “identification and fear of reprisal might 
deter perfectly peaceful discussions of public matters of importance.”92  
While the petitioner did not argue that revelation of his identity would 
cause him to worry about his personal safety, and withdraw from his 
activities, the Court nonetheless declared the ordinance void, suggesting 
that such a circumstance was not out of the question.93   
                                                                                                                          
85 Andrew P. Thomas, Easing the Pressure on Pressure Groups: Toward a Constitutional Right 
To Lobby, 16 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 149, 187–88 (1993). 
86 E.g., FREE SPEECH COAL., INC., supra note 53, at 7. 
87 Sekulow & Zimmerman, supra note 1, at 178. 
88 See William V. Luneburg, Anonymity and Its Dubious Relevance to the Constitutionality of 
Lobbying Disclosure Legislation, 19 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 69, 80–81 (2008) (observing that the 
petitioners in Patterson and Bates had clearly shown that harassment and other adverse consequences 
would result if they were to disclose membership lists, and that the Court committed itself to protecting 
the anonymity of advocates in cases such as these). 
89 362 U.S. 60 (1960). 
90 Id. at 60–61. 
91 Id. at 61–62. 
92 Id. at 64–65. 
93 See id. at 65 (noting that, given the aforesaid concerns that contributed to the decisions in 
Patterson and Bates, the Los Angeles ordinance “[was] subject to the same infirmity”). 
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Thirty-five years after Talley, the Supreme Court again held an 
identification provision unconstitutional as applied to an individual 
pamphleteer.  McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission94 involved an Ohio 
statute that prohibited the circulation of anonymous campaign literature.95  
The plaintiff’s decedent had distributed leaflets urging parents to vote 
against a proposed school tax levy without including her name on many of 
the documents, and incurred a fee for doing so.96  The Court, echoing its 
sentiment in Talley, explained that a pamphleteer’s decision to publish 
anonymously may stem from fear of retaliation or chastisement, or “a 
desire to preserve as much of [his or her] privacy as possible.”97  The Court 
also noted that anonymity may ensure that an audience does not prejudge 
or disregard an author’s message out of dislike for the author.98  As in 
Talley, the Court did not opine as to whether a risk of physical or 
reputational harm had caused the decedent to distribute her leaflets 
anonymously.  It instead observed that an author’s choice to remain 
anonymous is a constitutionally-protected aspect of freedom of speech.99  
The Court recognized that Ohio’s interest in exposing fraudulent conduct 
and its sources had special significance.100  Nevertheless, the Court found 
that this did not justify what it saw as a broad prohibition on the use of 
anonymous speech.101    
3.  Mistaken Presumptions About Constituent Decision-Making 
A final reason for not using grassroots lobbying laws to combat 
Astroturfing focuses on constituent audiences.  Opponents of legislation 
assert that grassroots lobbying bills falsely assume that citizens are naïve 
and impressionable, and that the government must strive to weed out 
Astroturfers to prevent constituents from making ill-informed choices that 
do not promote the general welfare.102  As opponents observe, citizens do 
not need the presence of grassroots efforts in order to make educated 
choices as to where they stand on political matters; they have the level-
headedness to form independent judgments, judgments based on personal 
                                                                                                                          
94 514 U.S. 334 (1995). 
95 Id. at 336. 
96 Id. at 337–38. 
97 Id. at 341–42. 
98 Id. at 342. 
99 Id.  
100 See id. at 349 (“We agree with Ohio’s submission that this interest [in preventing fraud] carries 
special weight during election campaigns when false statements, if credited, may have serious adverse 
consequences for the public at large.”). 
101 See id. at 357 (“Ohio has not shown that its interest in preventing the misuse of anonymous 
election-related speech justifies a prohibition of all uses of that speech.”). 
102 See Sekulow & Zimmerman, supra note 1, at 175 (“Grassroots lobbying bills are based upon 
the paternalistic notion that the government needs to regulate grassroots organizations because citizens 
are naïve, gullible, and incapable of making well-informed decisions about public policy on their 
own.”). 
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beliefs of the importance of these issues.103    
The McIntyre decision supported the notion that citizens do not need 
disclosure laws to effectively evaluate the messages of political advocates.  
The Court maintained that the identity of the author of a handbill or flier is 
“no different” from other features of the document’s content that the author 
may include or exclude at will.104  Because the recipients of handbills and 
fliers may have no prior acquaintance with the person who distributed 
them, the Court reasoned that disclosure laws such as those which Ohio 
enacted would not improve the reader’s ability to judge the author’s 
message.105  Furthermore, disclosure might, as the Court suggested (and as 
noted previously), dissuade the author from exercising his or her First 
Amendment right of political expression out of fear for his or her personal 
wellbeing.  Similarly, in a New York State case involving an allegedly 
overbroad election-related speech law, a New York trial court warned that 
to require political activists to disclose their identities is to underestimate 
the ability of average citizens to assess the sources of anonymous speech 
and the ideas the speech conveys.106 
III.  THE GOVERNMENT’S COMPELLING INTEREST IN IDENTIFYING AND 
CONTROLLING ASTROTURF LOBBYING 
Despite First Amendment concerns, the Supreme Court and other 
courts have maintained that the government has a compelling interest in 
addressing fake grassroots lobbying through registration, reporting, and 
disclosure requirements.  Even courts that have ruled against certain 
legislative efforts to address Astroturfing have not disagreed with this 
presupposition.  Part A discusses United States v. Harriss,107 a Supreme 
Court case upholding a federal lobbying disclosure law which the Court 
construed to apply to artificial grassroots advocacy.  Part B discusses 
subsequent case law at the state and federal level, showing that the 
governmental interest in exposing and controlling sham grassroots 
advocacy withstands the arguments of critics that legislative efforts to 
address Astroturfing are overbroad, silence grassroots advocates, and 
violate the anonymity principle.  Part B also shows that these arguments 
are inaccurate or exaggerated.  Lastly, Part C provides insight into 
                                                                                                                          
103 ACLU, ACLU Letter to the Senate Opposing Expansions of Post-Employment Bans and 
Regulations on Grassroots Lobbying (Mar. 7, 2006), http://www.aclu.org/print/free-speech/aclu-letter-
senate-opposing-expansions-post-employment-bans-and- regulations-grassroots-l. 
104 McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 348. 
105 Id. at 348–49. 
106 See New York v. Duryea, 351 N.Y.S.2d 978, 996 (Sup. Ct. 1974) (“People are intelligent 
enough to evaluate the source of an anonymous writing. . . .  They can evaluate its anonymity along 
with its message, as long as they are permitted, as they must be, to read that message.”), aff’d, 354 
N.Y.S.2d 129 (App. Div. 1974). 
107 347 U.S. 612 (1954). 
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campaign-finance reporting and disclosure requirements to illustrate that, 
just as these rules foster open and vibrant political discourse with respect to 
election-based speech, so too would similar standards in the area of 
grassroots lobbying.  
A.  United States v. Harriss: Early Approval of Grassroots Lobbying 
Legislation 
In 1946, Congress enacted the Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act 
(FRLA).108  The Act stated that persons compensated “to influence the 
passage or defeat of any [federal] legislation” were to register with the 
government and to disclose certain information, including who employed 
them, the amount of compensation they received, and the nature of their 
expenses.109  The Act further stipulated that failure to abide by these 
requirements could result in a penalty of up to $5,000 or imprisonment for 
upwards of one year, as well as a three-year ban on attempts to influence, 
“directly or indirectly, the passage or defeat of any proposed 
legislation.”110 
Eight years later, in United States v. Harriss, the Government charged 
a corporate lobbying body with failure to report the solicitation and receipt 
of contributions to influence the passage of legislation that would increase 
the price of certain agricultural goods and to defeat legislation that would 
cause a decrease in those prices.111  It also charged several individual 
lobbyists with failure to report expenditures directed at the 
accomplishment of these goals and failure to register with Congress.112  
These persons reportedly “were hired to express certain views to Congress 
as to agricultural prices or to cause others to do so,” and “arranged to have 
members of Congress contacted on behalf of these views” directly or via 
“an artificially stimulated letter campaign.”113  The defendants claimed that 
FRLA was unlawfully vague and that it violated their First Amendment 
rights of free speech, the press, and petition.114 
On the topic of vagueness, the Court narrowed the possible 
construction of FRLA in order to avoid doubts as to the Act’s validity.115  
The Government had argued that, under FRLA, all persons who incurred 
expenses for the purposes of influencing legislation were to report these 
expenses, regardless of whether they solicited or received contributions for 
                                                                                                                          
108 Ch. 753, 60 Stat. 839 (1946) (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. §§ 261–70 (1994)) (repealed in 
1995). 
109 Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act, 2 U.S.C. § 267(a) (1952). 
110 Id. § 269(a)–(b). 
111 Harriss, 347 U.S. at 614–15. 
112 Id. at 615–17. 
113 Id.  
114 Id. at 617. 
115 Id. at 620–21, 623. 
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doing so.116  The Court, however, disagreed, finding that the language of 
the provisions made clear that those required to file expense reports were 
strictly persons paid to encourage the passage or defeat of federal 
legislation.117  Nevertheless, the Court suggested that Congress could pass 
separate legislation covering persons who did not receive compensation for 
their advocacy activities.118 
The Court also observed that FRLA required expenditure reports and 
disclosures where the method of influencing the passage or defeat of 
legislation was through “direct communication” with or “direct pressure[]” 
on members of Congress.119  In listing conduct and activities which 
constituted “direct pressure,” the Court mentioned as one such example 
what it termed an “artificially stimulated letter campaign.”120  While the 
Court did not clarify what this phrase meant, the context in which it used 
the phrase and the Court’s discussion as to whether FRLA violated the 
defendants’ First Amendment liberties suggested that the phrase referred to 
Astroturf lobbying and that the prime objective of FRLA was to identify 
this conduct. 
In a footnote, the Court cited the legislative history of FRLA to show 
that direct pressure on members of Congress, to which FRLA applied, 
included an artificially stimulated letter campaign.  According to the text, 
persons and entities who “initiate[d] propaganda from all over the country 
in the form of letters and telegrams” were to disclose the sources of their 
“collections,” or information, and the methods by which they disbursed 
collections.121  This was because many such letters, telegrams, and related 
items were, or had the potential to be, “based entirely upon misinformation 
as to facts.”122  The Court also found that, based on the manner in which it 
interpreted FRLA, the Act did not violate the defendants’ freedoms of 
speech, the press, and petition.123  The Court then concluded that the 
ultimate aim of the Act was to identify lobbyists and front groups that 
posed as everyday public advocates: 
[L]egislative complexities are such that . . . members of 
Congress cannot be expected to explore the myriad pressures 
to which they are regularly subjected.  Yet full realization of 
the American ideal of government by elected representatives 
                                                                                                                          
116 Id. at 619–20. 
117 Id. at 623. 
118 See id. at 619–20 (suggesting that Congress could introduce “further legislation” applying 
FRLA’s reporting requirements to persons who did not solicit or receive compensation for their 
lobbying activities). 
119 Id. at 620, 623–24. 
120 Id. at 620. 
121 Id. at 620–21 & n.10 (quotation marks omitted). 
122 Id. 
123 Id. at 625. 
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depends . . . on their ability to properly evaluate such 
pressures.  Otherwise the voice of the people may all too 
easily be drowned out by the voice of special interest groups 
seeking favored treatment while masquerading as proponents 
of the public weal.  This is the evil which the Lobbying Act 
was designed to help prevent.124 
Activity of the kind highlighted in FRLA’s legislative history 
correlates with some characteristics of Astroturfing, including the sending 
of letters to elected leaders and the tendency of Astroturf lobbyists to 
misrepresent what their campaigns seek to achieve.125  Moreover, given 
that Astroturfing involves creating the impression that citizens have spoken 
out about specific government action, the Court’s phrasing evinces a belief 
that a primary goal of FRLA was to expose artificial grassroots activity 
and, through exposure, control it.  Further, the Court appeared to classify 
the prevention of special interests from “masquerading” as public interest 
proponents as a “vital national interest,” one that Congress could lawfully 
pursue through legislation like FRLA.126   
B.  Subsequent Case Law: Furthering the Harriss Precedent   
1.  Judicial Disagreement with the Alleged Reach and Possible 
Chilling Effect of Grassroots Lobbying Legislation 
Perhaps the greatest concern of opponents of legislative efforts to 
address Astroturf lobbying, as discussed earlier, is the conviction that such 
laws will extend to genuine grassroots advocacy and effectively silence 
real activists.  On the one hand, this is a legitimate concern, especially with 
respect to parties who express controversial views or who advocate in 
volatile locations, and for whom exemption from disclosure may be 
necessary.  On the other hand, opponents have either exaggerated the 
alleged reach of grassroots lobbying legislation and its capacity to chill the 
political expression of grassroots activists, or have made inaccurate claims 
about these issues.127  
Regarding statutory overbreadth in the area of the First Amendment, 
the Supreme Court has declared statutes unconstitutionally overbroad 
“sparingly and only as a last resort.”128  In Broadrick v. Oklahoma, the 
Court observed that it has sustained claims of facial overbreadth where 
                                                                                                                          
124 Id. (emphasis added). 
125 See MASKELL, supra note 45, at 11 (observing that artificially stimulated letter campaigns “are 
now often called ‘astroturf’ lobbying”).  
126 Harriss, 347 U.S. at 625–26; see also MASKELL, supra note 45, at 5 (suggesting that the 
Government’s asserted interest in protecting government processes from practices like Astroturfing 
“has been long recognized as a significant, important and compelling governmental interest”). 
127 See supra notes 49–58 and accompanying text. 
128 Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 613 (1973). 
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statutes seek to regulate pure speech and “the time, place, and manner of 
expressive or communicative conduct.”129  At the same time, however, the 
Court explained that overbreadth scrutiny is less rigid with respect to 
statutes which, in regulating specific conduct (and not merely speech), 
exert an incidental effect on First Amendment rights “in a neutral, 
noncensorial manner.”130  As to whether legislation which risks silencing 
grassroots activists represents an impermissible abridgment of their First 
Amendment liberties, opponents have not fully recognized that a possible 
deterrent effect may not be enough for a court to deem this kind of 
legislation unconstitutional.  Indeed, Harriss suggests that legislation like 
FRLA may stand even where the potential exists for activists to feel 
discouraged from engaging in advocacy.131   
In the wake of Harriss, federal and state courts have upheld 
registration, reporting, and disclosure laws against challenges regarding 
alleged statutory overbreadth and chilling effects.  One such case, 
Commission on Independent Colleges & Universities v. New York 
Temporary State Commission on Regulation of Lobbying,132 involved a 
challenge to the New York Regulation of Lobbying Act.  The Act required 
registration of and reporting of expenditures above $1,000 from anyone 
employed for the purpose of conducting “‘lobbying activities.’”133  
Lobbying activities were defined as “‘attempts to influence the passage or 
defeat of legislation by . . . the legislature, approval or disapproval of any 
legislation by the Governor, or the adoption or rejection of any rule or 
regulation having the force and effect of law.’”134  The statute also 
included both civil and criminal penalties for noncompliance.135  The 
plaintiffs contested the statute, arguing vagueness and that it was an 
overbroad restriction of their First Amendment freedoms of speech, 
petition, and association.136 
Concerning vagueness, the court found no evidence that the statute 
required disclosure of indirect lobbying activities that went beyond the 
direct pressures the Supreme Court mentioned in Harriss, observing that 
the New York State Legislature could lawfully tailor a disclosure law to 
cover indirect grassroots lobbying.137  As to the asserted chilling effect of 
                                                                                                                          
129 Id. at 612–13. 
130 Id. at 614. 
131 See Harriss, 347 U.S. at 626 (“The hazard of [First Amendment] restraint is too remote to 
require striking down a statute which on its face is otherwise plainly within the area of congressional 
power and is designed to safeguard a vital national interest.”). 
132 534 F. Supp. 489 (N.D.N.Y. 1982). 
133 Id. at 491. 
134 Id. at 491–92 (quoting N.Y. LEG. LAW §§ 3(a)–(b), 8(a)(1) (1982) (repealed 1987)).   
135 Id. at 492. 
136 Id. 
137 See id. at 496–97 (citing Harriss, 347 U.S. at 621 n.10) (observing that “[Harriss] held that 
indirect lobbying, in the form of campaigns to exhort the public to send letters and telegrams to 
government officials, could be included within the definition of lobbying activities”). 
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the statute, the court disagreed with the plaintiffs’ argument that the law 
deprived them of the ability to discuss the merits of proposed government 
action.  As the Harriss Court emphasized, the deterrent effect of a statute 
like FRLA emanates more from self-censorship by the party that abstains 
from advocacy than it does from the statute itself.138  Legislation critics 
charge that deterrence is directly attributable to the statute.139  In 
Commission on Independent Colleges, the court suggested that no chilling 
effect existed with regard to the plaintiffs, or that the plaintiffs, through 
self-censorship, had inflated the effect, if it did, in fact, exist.140  As the 
court noted, the plaintiffs offered no record of economic reprisals, loss of 
employment or other manifestations of hostility,141 conduct which 
influenced the Supreme Court in NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson142 
and Bates v. City of Little Rock143 to void similar disclosure laws.  The 
court held that New York’s interest in disclosure was compelling enough 
to outweigh the alleged deterrent effect of the statute.144     
Another case, Minnesota State Ethical Practices Board v. National 
Rifle Ass’n of America,145 centered on an NRA allegation that the 
Minnesota Ethics in Government Act violated NRA members’ freedom of 
association.146  The Act required lobbyists to register and to regularly 
report their lobbying activities, defining “lobbyist[s]” as individuals who 
received compensation and who spent more than a certain amount of time 
and money “for the purpose of attempting to influence legislative or 
administrative action by communicating or urging others to communicate 
with public officials.”147  The executive director for the NRA’s lobbying 
division had, in one year, sent several letters and a mailgram to the 
organization’s 54,000 members in Minnesota, encouraging them to contact 
their state legislators in support of pending legislation.148  In another year, 
the director mailed a letter, bumper sticker, and brochure to those same 
members, urging the defeat of a particular candidate in an upcoming 
election.149   
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals found that, in light of Harriss, 
                                                                                                                          
138 See Harriss, 347 U.S. at 626 (noting that, even if FRLA had a deterrent effect, “the restraint 
[was] at most an indirect one resulting from self-censorship”). 
139 See discussion supra Part II.B.1. 
140 See Comm’n on Indep. Colls. & Univs., 534 F. Supp. at 498 (“The Court believes that the 
plaintiffs [sic] arguments . . . fall largely into the category of self-censorship as outlined in Harriss v. 
United States.”). 
141 Id. at 498–99 (citations omitted). 
142 357 U.S. 449 (1958). 
143 361 U.S. 516 (1960). 
144 Comm’n on Indep. Colls. & Univs., 534 F. Supp. at 499. 
145 761 F.2d 509 (8th Cir. 1985) (per curiam). 
146 Id. at 510. 
147 Id. at 510–11 (citing MINN. STAT. §§ 10A.01–11(a), 10A.03–.04 (1984)).  
148 Id. at 511. 
149 Id. 
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identifying parties behind artificially stimulated letter campaigns was a 
compelling governmental interest justifying the Act’s registration 
provisions.150  The court also suggested that the actions of the NRA’s 
executive director amounted to an artificially stimulated letter campaign, 
even if they only involved contact between members within an 
organization instead of contact between separate entities.151  As to 
disclosure, the court made no finding that the statute was so broad as to 
impermissibly infringe on the plaintiffs’ ability to freely associate.  While 
the plaintiffs may have experienced some infringement, the court noted 
that they failed to apply for an exemption from the Act, which would take 
effect if the applicant could show that disclosure would expose it to 
reprisals, loss of employment, or threats of physical harm.152     
Similarly, the Eleventh Circuit in Florida League of Professional 
Lobbyists, Inc. v. Meggs153 rejected claims that Florida’s lobbying 
disclosure act was overbroad and thus invalid.  The contested sections 
required that lobbyists report indirect lobbying activities, including 
“‘media advertising [campaigns]’” and associated expenses.154  The 
plaintiff suggested that, to the extent the law required reporting of indirect 
expenses when there was no direct contact with elected officials, it was not 
narrowly tailored to meet Florida’s interest in “‘maintain[ing] the integrity 
of a basic governmental process.’”155  The court, rejecting this assertion, 
found that not only was Florida’s interest compelling, but that, in light of 
the rulings in Harriss and Minnesota State Ethical Practices Board, the 
First Amendment allowed compelled reporting of “considerably more than 
face-to-face contact with government officials.”156  The court added that a 
legislative interest in disclosure may be stronger with respect to indirect 
pressure on officials because of the possible difficulty involved in 
evaluating such pressure.157  
                                                                                                                          
150 See id. at 512 (noting that the Harriss Court concluded that “the Lobbying Act applied to the 
form of lobbying used in this case, namely, communication with lawmakers through an artificially 
stimulated letter campaign,” and finding that, as a result, Minnesota had “a compelling interest in 
requiring lobbyists to register their activities”). 
151 See id. at 513 (“When persons engage in an extensive letterwriting campaign for the purpose 
of influencing specific legislation, the State’s interest is the same whether or not those persons are 
members of an association.”); see also William V. Luneburg & Thomas M. Susman, Lobbying 
Disclosure: A Recipe for Reform, 33 J. LEGIS. 32, 45 (2006) (finding that current case law does not 
militate in favor of exemption from grassroots lobbying disclosure laws where contacts for action are 
interorganizational). 
152 Minn. State Ethical Practices Bd., 761 F.2d at 512 (citing MINN. STAT. § 10A.20-8 (1984)).   
153 87 F.3d 457 (11th Cir. 1996). 
154 Id. at 458–60 (citing FLA. STAT. § 11.045(3)(a) (1996)).   
155 Id. at 460 (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 625 (1954)). 
156 Id. at 461. 
157 See id. (“[T]he government interest in providing the means to evaluate . . . pressures [on 
officials] may in some ways be stronger when the pressures are indirect, because then they are harder to 
identify without the aid of disclosure requirements.”). 
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The Vermont Supreme Court in Kimbell v. Hooper158 likewise upheld 
challenged provisions of Vermont’s lobbying disclosure law, which 
required persons who received compensation above a certain amount for 
purposes of influencing legislators to report their indirect contacts to 
influence legislative or administrative action.159  The court noted that 
statutes such as Vermont’s are not subject to the same strict scrutiny as 
laws which burden pure speech, because lobbying activities entail conduct 
in addition to speech.160  Moreover, the court reasoned that the statute 
furthered the vital governmental interest of preventing paid lobbyists from 
posing as advocates of the public welfare.161  Accordingly, the court 
neither regarded the statute as overbroad nor found reason to declare the 
law unconstitutional because of the mere possibility that it could have a 
chilling effect on activists.162  
The above cases show that, based on the findings of numerous courts, 
grassroots lobbying statutes do not present a uniform risk of silencing 
grassroots advocates, and that an alleged risk to certain parties does not 
justify a complete prohibition on the use of such laws to address fake 
grassroots advocacy.  Opponents are right that Patterson and Bates stand 
for the notion that laws which will substantially curtail the ability of 
specific grassroots advocates to express themselves politically cannot 
stand.  But the cases discussed above show that plaintiffs who seek to 
overturn such laws must provide evidence that disclosure would expose 
them to hostility, and not speculate as to the threat.163  Talley v. 
California164 and McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission165 may not have 
required factual demonstrations, but, as the next subsection argues, there 
seems to be another reason why the Supreme Court ruled as it did in those 
cases.  Montana Automobile Ass’n v. Greely166 likewise may be an 
exception to the rule, as a state court case, but it appears to be alone in this 
regard,167 and the court in Greely still perceived a compelling 
governmental interest in disclosure for purposes of identifying Astroturf 
                                                                                                                          
158 665 A.2d 44 (Vt. 1995). 
159 Id. at 46 & n.1 (citing VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 2 §§ 261(5), (9)–(10) (1993)).   
160 See id. at 47 (suggesting that, in regard to lobbying, “‘conduct and not merely speech [are] 
involved,’” signifying that alleged statutory overbreadth “‘must not only be real, but substantial as well, 
judged in relation to the statute’s plainly legitimate sweep,’” before a court may find the statute 
unconstitutionally overbroad (quoting Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615 (1973))). 
161 Id. at 48. 
162 Id. at 48–49 (citations omitted). 
163 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 69–70 (1976), similarly supports this point.   
164 362 U.S. 60 (1960). 
165 514 U.S. 334 (1995). 
166 632 P.2d 300 (Mont. 1981). 
167 See MASKELL, supra note 45, at 15 & n.59 (citing Greely but mentioning no other state court 
decision holding that disclosure of “‘indirect’” grassroots lobbying goes beyond the allowable bounds 
of governmental regulation). 
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lobbying.168  Finally, the statutes at issue in Patterson and Bates 
(particularly the former) did not concern revealing and deterring 
Astroturfing so much as enabling the respective jurisdictions to learn more 
about certain organizations with which they were at odds.169 
2.  Clarification of the Scope of the Right To Speak and Publish 
Anonymously 
While Talley and McIntyre suggest that an activist’s interest in 
anonymity trumps the mandates of grassroots lobbying disclosure laws 
even where the risk of a chilling effect on advocacy efforts is speculative, 
it is not apparent that the activity in those cases constitutes issue advocacy 
in its commonly-understood sense.  The main conception of issue 
advocacy, touched upon in Part I, is that it encompasses efforts of ordinary 
constituents to communicate their viewpoints to elected officials, usually 
their representatives, and to convince other citizens to follow suit.170  
Although Talley and McIntyre involved the expression of particular 
viewpoints, it does not appear that the speakers in those cases directed their 
statements toward elected representatives or that they attempted to 
persuade fellow constituents to share similar outlooks with officials.  The 
plaintiff in Talley had espoused a belief in equal-opportunity hiring 
practices and encouraged others to not buy from certain retailers,171 while 
the speaker in McIntyre had criticized a prospective school tax and 
requested that residents vote against it.172  Activity of this kind—perhaps 
best described as “‘speech on the street”’ or “anonymous speech in the 
public sphere”173—seems to garner greater protection of the asserted right 
to speak and publish anonymously than does the petitioning of 
governmental bodies,174  under which grassroots lobbying would appear to 
                                                                                                                          
168 The Greely court inferred from the purpose of the ballot initiative “a compelling need for 
disclosure,” even if some components of the measure were unlawful.  Greely, 632 P.2d at 302–03. 
169 Professor Luneburg observes that, with respect to the law in question in Patterson, “[w]hatever 
lobbying the NAACP may have undertaken in Alabama, that was clearly not the main concern of the 
state.”  Luneburg, supra note 88, at 80.  Instead, “the activity of the organization in trying to assist the 
admission of blacks to state universities and in supporting a boycott by blacks of a bus line in 
Montgomery allegedly violated [the requirement that] foreign corporations . . . ‘qualify’ before doing 
business in Alabama.”  Id. 
170 See, e.g., Sekulow & Zimmerman, supra note 1, at 173–74 (“Grassroots [advocacy] is simply 
the efforts of average Americans to share their viewpoints with their elected representatives and [to] 
encourage other Americans to do the same.”). 
171 Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 61 (1960). 
172 McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 337 & n.2 (1995). 
173 Luneburg, supra note 88, at 82, 85. 
174 Professor Luneburg makes the following distinction: 
[The] public tradition for petitioning governmental bodies should be contrasted with 
the long and contemporaneous practice of anonymous speech in the public sphere 
relied upon in cases like Talley and McIntyre. . . .  [In] fashioning the contours of 
freedom of speech in the public sphere the Supreme Court has appropriately 
considered the need for anonymity to improve the quality and quantity of public 
debate, [but] history decidedly does not [suggest] that anonymity should attach to 
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primarily fall.  Furthermore, the Supreme Court in McIntyre recognized 
limitations to its decision, suggesting that, in “larger circumstances,” there 
may be a more substantial interest in identity disclosure.175 
Even assuming that the right to speak and publish anonymously 
applies to grassroots lobbyists, critics exaggerate the scope of coverage this 
right affords.  The principle of anonymity may, for instance, permit 
advocacy groups to refrain from divulging member identities where a 
genuine risk of hostility exists.  But courts have found that disclosure of 
other information, such as the identities of contributors and the financial 
support they supply to advocacy groups, which may indirectly illuminate 
the identities of parties that belong to these groups, is acceptable.176  
The Supreme Court of Washington in Young Americans for Freedom, 
Inc. v. Gorton177 upheld a detailed lobbying disclosure statute against a 
claim that the law required disclosure of the respondent organization’s 
entire membership list and the identities of contributors to a specific 
campaign, and thereby violated the organization’s First Amendment rights 
of association and privacy.178  The controversial provision required 
reporting of “grass roots campaign activity” designed, directly or 
indirectly, to influence legislation, and if campaign expenses exceeded a 
specified threshold, the party sponsoring the campaign had to additionally 
report contributions and the names and addresses of contributors.179  The 
court narrowly construed the act so that groups engaged in grassroots 
campaigns would not need to reveal their membership lists, yet observed 
that the statute could still require the disclosure of contributors without 
unduly impinging on the association and privacy rights of these groups.180  
It also refused to strike down the section of the statute mandating 
disclosure of indirect lobbying activities, finding that doing so “would 
leave a loophole for indirect lobbying” and render the public uninformed 
as to the sponsorship of activities such as “‘artificially stimulated letter 
campaign[s].’”181  This concern, according to the court, was “paramount” 
to the respondent’s interest in avoiding the inconvenience of reporting its 
                                                                                                                          
petitions for governmental action.   
Id. at 85.  In addition, the Supreme Court in McDonald v. Smith, 472 U.S. 479, 482 (1985), found that 
the right of petition merits no more defense than that afforded freedom of speech (or, for that matter, 
other First Amendment liberties), because the former is in essence “cut from the same cloth” as the 
latter.   
175 McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 358 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).  More on this point appears in Part 
IV.A.3 infra. 
176 See infra notes 177–90 and accompanying text.  
177 522 P.2d 189 (Wash. 1974) (en banc). 
178 Id. at 191.  The right of privacy to which the respondent alluded and which the court 
mentioned seems to refer to “privacy in one’s associations.”  NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 
U.S. 449, 462 (1958).   
179 Gorton, 522 P.2d at 191. 
180 Id. at 191–92. 
181 Id. at 192 (italics omitted) (quoting United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 620 (1954)).   
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indirect advocacy activities.182 
More recently, the court in ProtectMarriage.com v. Bowen183 upheld 
provisions of California’s Political Reform Act (PRA) against similar 
attacks.184  These sections required that ballot committees disclose the 
names and other personal information of parties who contributed at least 
one hundred dollars, which the plaintiff committees attacked as not 
narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest and thus violative of 
the First Amendment.185  The court conceded that these provisions affected 
the ability of the committees to privately associate.186  Nonetheless, it 
found that California had a compelling interest in unmasking phony 
grassroots advocacy by providing citizens with details about contributors 
and expenditures targeted at the passage or defeat of ballot initiatives.187  
The court also found no evidence that any of the plaintiffs’ contributors 
would cease providing support to the plaintiffs if faced with identity 
disclosure.188  Moreover, the threats and harassment the plaintiffs claimed 
would befall them if forced to divulge information regarding their 
contributors were not, as the court reasoned, so great as to justify affording 
the plaintiffs the benefit of anonymity.189  Lastly, the court found that the 
PRA’s one hundred-dollar disclosure threshold was not overly burdensome 
to the plaintiffs, noting that it did not restrict how much contributors could 
give to committees or how much committees could spend on advocacy.190 
C.  Election-Based Speech Laws, the Marketplace of Ideas, and Its 
Application to Grassroots Lobbying 
The Supreme Court has offered greater direct insight into the validity 
of election-related speech disclosure laws than it has similar laws regarding 
grassroots lobbying.  Yet the Court’s findings in the area of election-based 
speech—in particular, that disclosure is generally constitutional—have 
relevance to legislative efforts to address Astroturfing, suggesting that 
disclosure of artificial grassroots advocacy would support the free flow of 
                                                                                                                          
182 Id. 
183 599 F. Supp. 2d 1197 (E.D. Cal. 2009). 
184 Id. at 1204, 1223–24, 1226.  
185 Id. at 1199, 1204. 
186 See id. at 1205–06 (noting that the ability to freely associate enhances the efficacy of advocacy 
efforts, and that compelled disclosure of contributors to committees such as the plaintiffs “indisputably 
impinges on those vital freedoms of belief and assembly”). 
187 See id. at 1209 (“‘[D]isclosure . . . prevents the wolf from masquerading in sheep’s clothing.’” 
(quoting Cal. Pro-Life Council, Inc. v. Getman, 328 F.3d 1088, 1106 n.24 (9th Cir. 2003))); see also id. 
at 1211 (“[T]he Government’s interest is not only compelling, but critical to the proper functioning of 
the State’s system of direct democracy.”). 
188 See id. at 1215 (“Finally, there is no evidence that any of Plaintiffs’ contributors intend to 
retreat from the marketplace of ideas such that available discourse will be materially diminished.”). 
189 Id. at 1216–17, 1219–20. 
190 Id. at 1221–24.  Moreover, fewer than ten states had higher threshold requirements for 
disclosure at the time.  Id. at 1221–22 & n.10.   
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ideas in political discourse.  Moreover, these findings weaken the notion 
that grassroots lobbying laws treat citizens as incapable of informed and 
independent decision-making, showing that such laws instead provide 
constituents with access to information that may otherwise be inaccessible 
and which may be of interest to them. 
1.  Buckley v. Valeo and the Federal Election Campaign Act 
In 1974, Congress amended the Federal Election Campaign Act of 
1971 (FECA).191  The new statutory scheme provided that political action 
committees, candidates running for election to federal offices and donors 
who spent or gave more than one hundred dollars in a calendar year were 
to file statements of receipts and expenses.192  The provisions required 
disclosure of substantial information, including the names, mailing 
addresses, occupations, and principal places of business of campaign 
contributors.193  In Buckley v. Valeo, the Supreme Court found the 
mandates constitutional.  The Court noted that forced disclosure could lead 
to substantial encroachments on First Amendment rights, and so, as 
discussed earlier, subjected the provisions to exacting scrutiny analysis.194  
Yet it found that the governmental interests Congress sought to advance 
through the FECA amendments were “sufficiently important to outweigh 
the possibility of [First Amendment] infringement.”195  In construing the 
disclosure amendments as applying only to groups who contributed funds 
to “expressly advocate the election or defeat of a clearly identified 
candidate,” and not to groups whose contributions were simply part of 
“issue discussion,” the court upheld the provisions, finding that they not 
only operated to deter corruption or its appearance, but illuminated 
campaign-related expenditures that would otherwise go unreported.196 
The Buckley Court also suggested that the disclosure provisions were 
consistent with the concept of the marketplace of ideas.  Under this 
concept, freedom of expression must have minimal restraints in order to 
promote robust exchange and discussion.  The more points-of-view 
circulating among citizens, the better able citizens are to ascertain ideas or 
                                                                                                                          
191 Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (1972) (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. §§ 431–56 (1976)). 
192 2 U.S.C. § 434(a), (e). 
193 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 63 (1976) (citing 2 U.S.C. § 434(b)).  
194 Id. at 64, 66. 
195 Id. at 66.  The Court noted three categories of interests that Congress sought to vindicate:  
First, disclosure provides the electorate with information [about sources and uses of 
campaign money] in order to aid the voters in evaluating those who seek federal 
office. . . .  Second, disclosure requirements deter actual corruption and avoid the 
appearance of corruption by exposing large contributions and expenditures to the 
light of publicity. . . .  Third, and not least significant, recordkeeping, reporting, and 
disclosure requirements are an essential means of gathering the data necessary to 
detect violations of the contribution limitations described above.   
Id. at 66–68. 
196 Id. at 79–82. 
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policies with which they agree (or disagree) most.197  In the Buckley 
Court’s opinion, the disclosure provisions did not muzzle the ability of 
donors to espouse their views in the form of monetary contributions.  
Instead, the provisions were a “minimally restrictive” means of promoting 
First Amendment values “by opening the basic processes of [the country’s] 
federal election system to public view.”198  The Court seemed to find that, 
rather than treating citizens as naïve or incapable of informed evaluation of 
speech, the provisions sought to make available information of political 
importance,199 with no indication that disclosure would reduce the 
vivaciousness of political discourse.  
2.  McConnell v. FEC, FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc., Citizens 
United v. FEC, and the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act  
Following Buckley, other courts have agreed that election-based speech 
disclosure provisions promote open and active discourse.200  The Supreme 
Court expanded on Buckley in 2003 in deciding McConnell v. FEC.201  The 
Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA)202 amended FECA to 
mandate the disclosure of “electioneering communications.”  It defined this 
activity as broadcast, cable, or satellite communications that clearly 
identified candidates for federal office, and which ran either sixty days 
before a general election for the office sought or thirty days before a 
primary election for the same office.203  Congress had promulgated the 
revisions in part because it had observed that, post-Buckley, parties could 
circumvent FECA’s demands for disclosure of express advocacy 
contributions by asking donors to give money to interest groups that ran 
supportive issue advertisements.204  The McConnell Court found BCRA’s 
definition of “electioneering communications” acceptable, even as applied 
                                                                                                                          
197 See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“[Citizens] 
may come to believe . . . that the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas—that the 
best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the  
market . . . .”). 
198 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 82. 
199 See id. at 81 (suggesting that disclosure of expenditures that would otherwise go unreported 
would help voters better define the “constituencies” of political candidates). 
200 See, e.g., FEC v. Furgatch, 807 F.2d 857, 862 (9th Cir. 1987) (“The vision of a free and open 
marketplace of ideas is based on the assumption that the people should be exposed to speech on all 
sides, so that they may freely evaluate and choose from among competing points of view.”).  The court 
found that the First Amendment aims to ensure that citizens have available to them all the information 
necessary to evaluate speech.  Id.  Thus the court observed that disclosure requirements “are 
indispensable to the proper and effective exercise of First Amendment rights.”  Id. 
201 540 U.S. 93 (2003), overruled in part by Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010). 
202 Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81 (2002) (codified 
primarily in scattered sections of 2 and 47 U.S.C.).  
203 2 U.S.C. § 434(f)(3)(A)(i) (2006). 
204 See McConnell, 540 U.S. at 129 (“[P]olitical parties and candidates used the availability of so-
called issue ads to circumvent FECA’s limitations, asking donors who contributed their permitted quota 
of hard money to give money to nonprofit corporations to spend on ‘issue’ advocacy.” (citing 
McConnell v. FEC, 251 F. Supp. 2d 176, 518–19 (D.D.C. 2003))). 
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to issue advocacy, noting that the express advocacy limitation in Buckley 
stemmed from statutory interpretation, not constitutional orders.205  The 
Court also rejected the notion that the First Amendment “erects a rigid 
barrier between express advocacy and so-called issue advocacy,” for while 
electioneering communications may not explicitly urge their audience to 
vote for or against a candidate, they still intend to influence the election.206      
In addition to the above requirements, BCRA stipulated that persons 
disbursing more than $10,000 in a calendar year for the direct costs of 
producing and airing electioneering communications were to disclose the 
identities or principal places of business of all parties sharing the costs of 
the expenditures and the elections to which the communications 
pertained.207  The Court determined that Congress had important interests 
in mind when it enacted BCRA, namely, providing the electorate with 
information and deterring actual or apparent corruption in election-related 
speech.208  The Court thus appeared to agree that the BCRA disclosure 
requirements—like the FECA provisions before them—fostered 
transparent discussion and provided essential details for constituents 
seeking to make informed political decisions.209  This was especially true 
because the provisions barred no party from speaking and required no 
party to reveal the specific contents of electioneering communications.210  
Consequently, the Court found BCRA’s disclosure requirements 
constitutional.211 
The Supreme Court’s more recent decisions in FEC v. Wisconsin Right 
to Life, Inc.212 and Citizens United v. FEC213 have invalidated sections of 
BCRA, but have not disturbed McConnell as it concerns disclosure.  Prior 
to Wisconsin Right to Life, BCRA criminalized all organizational 
sponsorship of electioneering communications.214  In asserting that the 
Constitution does not compel a distinction between issue advocacy and 
express advocacy, the Court in McConnell found the penalty lawful as 
                                                                                                                          
205 Id. at 190–94. 
206 Id. at 193. 
207 2 U.S.C. § 434(f)(1), (2)(A)–(B), (D) (2006).  The McConnell Court referred to these 
provisions as components of “amended FECA § [304].”  McConnell, 540 U.S. at 194. 
208 McConnell, 540 U.S. at 196. 
209 See id. at 196–97 (restating the District Court’s opinion that the plaintiffs failed to show how 
vibrant speech can occur when entities can shield themselves from disclosure, and that the plaintiffs’ 
argument for invalidating BCRA’s disclosure orders failed to reinforce the First Amendment values the 
plaintiffs argued BCRA burdened, yet ignored the competing First Amendment interests of citizens 
seeking to make informed political decisions). 
210 Id. at 201 (quoting McConnell v. FEC, 251 F. Supp. 2d 176, 241 (D.D.C. 2003)). 
211 Id. at 201–02. 
212 551 U.S. 449 (2007). 
213 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010). 
214 Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 §§ 203(a), 214(d), 312(a), 2 U.S.C. §§ 
437g(d)(1)(A), 441b(a), (b)(2) (2006). 
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applied to issue advocacy.215  Yet it also noted that the interests that 
justified the regulation of express advocacy (or “campaign speech”)—such 
as those emphasized in Buckley—might not apply to the regulation of issue 
advocacy (or “genuine issue ads”).216   
The Court in Wisconsin Right to Life used this observation to find that 
the plaintiff’s advertisements were not functionally equivalent to express 
advocacy.217  The advertisements encouraged viewers to contact 
Wisconsin’s Senators and tell them to oppose filibusters of judicial 
nominees, and the plaintiff intended to continue broadcasting them 
throughout the month of the state’s 2004 primary.218  The Court determined 
that the advertisements would be functionally equivalent to express 
advocacy, and thus regulable only if “susceptible of no reasonable 
interpretation other than as an appeal to vote for or against a specific 
candidate.”219  In applying this analysis, the Court concluded that the 
advertisements were not the functional equivalent of express advocacy; the 
Court observed that the advertisements displayed the hallmarks of a 
“genuine issue ad”—in that they focused and took a position on a 
legislative issue, exhorted the public to do the same, and urged constituent 
contacts with elected officials—and that they failed to mention a particular 
election or candidate or take a stance on a candidate’s character or 
qualifications.220  The Court hence found BCRA’s criminalization of 
electioneering communications, in the context of issue advocacy, 
unconstitutional.221   
In Citizens United, the plaintiff sought to run television commercials 
promoting a documentary it had produced about then-Senator Hillary 
Clinton and to make the film available through video-on-demand.222  At the 
time, Senator Clinton was a candidate in the Democratic Party’s 2008 
Presidential primary elections, and the film mentioned her by name and 
contained commentary critical of her.223  The plaintiff planned to pay for 
the commercials, which would run within thirty days of the primaries, but 
BCRA prohibited corporations from using general treasury funds to 
                                                                                                                          
215 McConnell, 540 U.S. at 204–05, 209.  More recently, though, a Colorado court found that a 
similar state law only covered communications that contained “‘magic words’” expressly advocating 
the election or defeat of candidates—such as “‘vote for,’ ‘elect,’ . . . ‘vote against,’ [and] ‘defeat.’”  
Colo. Ethics Watch v. Senate Majority Fund, LLC, Nos. 08CA2689 & 09CA0384, 2010 Colo. App. 
LEXIS 368, at *1, *6–7, *24, *32–33 (Colo. App. Mar. 18, 2010) (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 
1, 44 n.52 (1976)).  
216 McConnell, 540 U.S. at 206–07 n.88. 
217 Wis. Right to Life, 551 U.S. at 478–79. 
218 Id. at 458–60. 
219 Id. at 469–70. 
220 Id. at 470. 
221 See id. at 481 (holding the aforesaid provision unconstitutional as applied to the plaintiff’s 
advertisements). 
222 Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 887 (2010). 
223 Id.  
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independently finance electioneering communications expressly 
advocating the election or defeat of a candidate for office.224   
Observing that speakers from all areas of society use money to fund 
their speech, and that the First Amendment protects this activity, the Court 
found no support for the idea that the First Amendment “would permit the 
suppression of [corporate] political speech.”225  The Court reasoned that 
the purpose and effect of the expenditure prohibition was to prevent 
corporate ideas from reaching the public.226  It further reasoned that the 
potential for unrestricted spending to greatly influence elections would not 
cause citizens “to lose faith in our democracy,” noting that the willingness 
of corporations to spend money in an attempt to persuade voters 
“presupposes that the people have the ultimate influence over elected 
officials.”227  Hence, in finding that the BCRA provision amounted to a 
command as to where the electorate could get its information, the Court 
held it unlawful.228   
Despite these decisions, McConnell still stands as good law as it 
pertains to disclosure under BCRA.  Nowhere in Wisconsin Right to Life 
did the Court take issue with BCRA’s disclosure demands, which raise 
fewer First Amendment concerns than do outright prohibitions on certain 
forms of advocacy.229  Had the Court sought to overturn McConnell’s 
ruling that BCRA could mandate disclosure of issue-advocate-sponsored 
electioneering communications, or had it sought to equate “regulation” 
with disclosure, it could have explicitly done so.  But while this lack of 
explicit language in Wisconsin Right to Life about disclosure may suggest 
only tacit accordance with McConnell, the Citizens United Court directly 
agreed that disclosure furthers important governmental interests and fosters 
informed political discussion.230     
                                                                                                                          
224 See id. at 887–88 (citing Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 § 203, 2 U.S.C. § 
441b(b)(2) (2006)) (“Corporations and unions are barred from using their general treasury funds for 
express advocacy or electioneering communications.”). 
225 Id. at 905–06. 
226 Id. at 907. 
227 Id. at 910. 
228 See id. at 908, 911 (comparing the effect of the provision to unconstitutional censorship and an 
impermissible outright ban on corporate political speech during preelection periods). 
229 See Luneburg, supra note 88, at 103 (noting that Wisconsin Right to Life may have signaled a 
departure from the notion that disclosure of at least some grassroots advocacy is constitutional, but that 
the case involved the criminalization of the activity in question instead of simply disclosure, which 
does not risk burdening First Amendment rights to the same degree); see also Krishnakumar, supra 
note 17, at 534 (“[D]isclosure . . . may be the only method of lobbying regulation permissible under the 
First Amendment.”); Steven A. Browne, Note, The Constitutionality of Lobby Reform: Implicating 
Associational Privacy and the Right To Petition the Government, 4 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 717, 
736–37 (1995) (“Mere registration and reporting requirements do not interfere substantially with any 
First Amendment rights.”). 
230 See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 915–16 (observing that the electorate’s interest in knowing 
the identities of those speaking about candidates justified BCRA’s disclosure provisions, and that 
disclosure enables citizens to make informed political decisions and to properly evaluate different 
speakers and messages). 
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3.  Application to Grassroots Lobbying Laws and the Control of 
Astroturfing 
The decisions in Buckley, McConnell, and Citizens United—and, to a 
lesser extent, Wisconsin Right to Life—apply for several reasons to efforts 
to address Astroturfing through grassroots lobbying legislation.  First, the 
cases show that speech in the framework of elections is a form of political 
advocacy.  The Supreme Court intimated that a campaign contribution or 
an advertisement indirectly urging citizens to contact their representatives, 
depending on its source, constitutes issue advocacy.  Indeed, both involve 
conveying certain views to elected officials or encouraging others to do the 
same.  Given the finding in McConnell that BCRA’s disclosure 
requirements could lawfully apply to electioneering communications of 
both the express and the genuine-issue variety and promote an open 
exchange of ideas, it would appear that disclosure laws directed at 
grassroots lobbying outside the elections context are similarly 
constitutional and—by ensuring citizen exposure to information—would 
likewise promote the sort of active discourse that the First Amendment 
seeks to cultivate.231  The above cases would also seem to suggest that 
grassroots lobbying disclosure laws simply seek to make available 
information that may be of political significance to curious citizens, but 
that is not readily accessible in the absence of such requirements.   
Additionally, just as statutes like FECA and BCRA strive to deter 
corruption, or its appearance, in election-based speech, so too does 
grassroots lobbying legislation aim to dissuade powerful individuals and 
special interest groups from engaging in artificial grassroots advocacy.  
The Court has on numerous occasions found that the government has a 
sufficiently important interest in deterring real or apparent corruption in 
election-based speech via disclosure laws,232 and McConnell extends the 
reach of such laws to the electioneering communications of issue 
advocates.  Just as an electorate with knowledge of a candidate’s most 
generous supporters could better discern special favors given in return for 
                                                                                                                          
231 See Luneburg & Susman, supra note 151, at 39 (arguing that “[m]andatory disclosure of 
lobbying pressures” comports with the marketplace of ideas concept in that it ensures the availability of 
relevant information to the public and to politicians for their consideration in developing public policy). 
232 See, e.g., Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 241, 243–44 (2006) (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 
U.S. 1, 25, 55 (1976)) (noting the Buckley Court’s conclusion that the Government’s interest in 
preventing corruption and its appearance provided ample justification for limits on campaign 
contributions and finding no basis for overruling Buckley); McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 196 (2003) 
(concluding that the governmental interest in deterring corruption, which justified FECA’s disclosure 
requirements, likewise justified those of BCRA); Buckley, 424 U.S. at 67 (arguing that disclosure 
checks the improper use of money in politics by placing large contributions and expenditures in the 
public light); Burroughs v. United States, 290 U.S. 534, 547–48 (1934) (stating that Congress retains 
the power to protect presidential elections from corruption and declining to question Congress’s 
determination that disclosure of political contributions, the names of contributors and other details 
“would tend to prevent the corrupt use of money to affect elections”). 
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contributions,233 so too could informed citizens and government officials 
better detect the presence of Astroturfing by those with deep pockets and 
an issue to advance or defeat.   
IV.  DEVISING WORKABLE LEGISLATION TO ADDRESS  
ASTROTURF LOBBYING 
Congress has precedent upon which it may, and should, draw in 
crafting legislation to expose and control Astroturfing.  This Part considers 
how to construct laws which will effectively address artificial grassroots 
advocacy without significantly encroaching on the ability of ordinary 
citizens to communicate with elected officials and fellow citizens about 
possible government action.  Part A examines some of the aspects of the 
Senate’s most recent foray into grassroots lobbying legislation, in 
conjunction with current lobbying laws, finding that, for the most part, the 
proposed statute was a step in the right direction toward meaningful 
lobbying reform.234  Part B considers other features that future grassroots 
lobbying legislation could account for to strengthen the proposals. 
A.  The Lobbying Transparency and Accountability Act: Proposed 
Grassroots Lobbying Provisions in the Context of Current Lobbying 
Laws 
1.  Distinction Between Grassroots Advocacy and Astroturf Lobbying 
As explained in Part II, the Lobbying Transparency and Accountability 
Act of 2007, parts of which became components of the Honest Leadership 
and Open Government Act of 2007,235 initially contained a section 
dedicated to the disclosure of Astroturfing.236  The section distinguished 
“grassroots lobbying” from “paid efforts to stimulate grassroots lobbying.”  
“Grassroots lobbying” referred to voluntary efforts of members of the 
public to convey their views on a given matter to federal officials or to 
persuade other citizens to do the same.237  “Paid efforts to stimulate 
grassroots lobbying,” on the other hand, referred to paid attempts on behalf 
of a client to encourage the general public, or certain segments thereof, to 
contact elected leaders and urge them to take a certain stance on a certain 
                                                                                                                          
233 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 67.  The Buckley Court noted that “‘informed public opinion is the most 
potent of all restraints upon misgovernment.’”  Id. at 67 n.79 (quoting Grosjean v. Am. Press Co., 297 
U.S. 233, 250 (1936)). 
234 Part A will only analyze the 2007 Senate proposal; the Shays-Meehan bill mostly contained 
the same provisions as its Senate counterpart. 
235 Pub. L. No. 110-81, §§ 201–15, 2007 U.S.C.C.A.N. (121 Stat.) 735 (2007) (to be codified in 
scattered sections of 2 U.S.C.). 
236 S. 1, 110th Cong. § 220 (2007). 
237 Id. § 220(a)(2). 
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issue.238  The definition of the former thus comported with the general 
conception of activity that constitutes issue advocacy, while the definition 
of the latter paralleled the Supreme Court’s notion of conduct representing 
an artificially-stimulated letter campaign in United States v. Harriss.239   
To ease potential concerns of citizen activists, the proposal specified 
that lobbying activities, for purposes of the amended Lobbying Disclosure 
Act of 1995, would include “paid efforts to stimulate grassroots lobbying” 
but not “grassroots lobbying.”240  Moreover, to protect associations such as 
nonprofits, the proposal stated that “paid efforts to stimulate grassroots 
lobbying” would not include internal communications between an entity 
and its members, employees, or officers.241  Thus the Lobbying 
Transparency and Accountability Act made explicit that its registration, 
reporting, and disclosure provisions were not to apply to the spontaneous 
efforts of individual citizen advocates.    
2.  Thresholds for Disclosure 
The Act also indicated that it was not to apply to grassroots advocacy 
in a more indirect manner.  Additional provisions took into consideration 
the restricted size of many grassroots movements and the limited resources 
upon which advocates may draw, and thus sought to protect advocates that 
may fall within the “paid efforts” category.  For example, one section 
indicated that paid attempts to stimulate grassroots lobbying did not 
include instances where lobbyists direct their efforts to encourage citizen 
contacts of elected officials at fewer than 500 persons.242  Although this 
provision would have risked exempting smaller cases of Astroturfing, it 
nevertheless would have addressed larger and more influential campaigns. 
The Act further specified that parties that engage in paid efforts to 
stimulate grassroots lobbying would not need to register with the 
government or report or disclose the activities toward which their 
expenditures or income go unless spending or funding exceeds $25,000 
quarterly.243  The $25,000 threshold would protect grassroots advocates, 
since many, if not most, would lack the financial resources to exceed or 
consistently exceed this amount.  It would also identify the sponsors of 
costly Astroturf campaigns that have succeeded in shaping public 
                                                                                                                          
238 Id.  
239 347 U.S. 612, 620 (1954). 
240 S. 1, § 220(a)(1) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
241 Id. § 220(a)(2).  But cf. Minn. State Ethical Practices Bd. v. Nat’l Rifle Ass’n of Am., 761 F.2d 
509, 512–13 (8th Cir. 1985) (per curiam) (suggesting that the internal communications of an entity 
directed at its members could fall within the ambit of an “artificially stimulated letter campaign” and 
thus be subject to lobbying disclosure requirements). 
242 S. 1, § 220(a)(2).  
243 Id. § 220(a)(2), (b), (c)(1). 
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opinion—though a lower threshold might suffice.244  Having four reporting 
periods, which the Honest Leadership and Open Government Act 
adopted,245 would ensure more frequent reporting and allow for closer 
observations as to trends in the financing and expenses of supposed 
grassroots-level campaigns.  In addition, the Lobbying Transparency and 
Accountability Act stated that the $25,000 threshold would apply 
specifically to parties whom clients pay to engage in artificial issue 
advocacy on their behalf, not parties who advocate on their own volition.246    
3.  Disclosure of Income, Expenses, and Identities 
Under the Lobbying Transparency and Accountability Act, “lobbying 
activities,” for purposes of determining whether a lobbyist would be 
exempt from registration, would not include paid attempts to stimulate 
grassroots lobbying.247  Considering the requirements of the Act alongside 
the demands of active lobbying laws, lobbyists who engage in Astroturfing 
would need to register in the event they receive more than $2,500 of 
income or spend more than $10,000 in connection with direct lobbying 
activities on behalf of a client.248  The registration would need to include 
details such as the registrant’s name, address, contact information, 
principal place of business, and a general description of his or her 
activities, as well as similar information for the registrant’s clients.249  The 
registrant would also need to include the name, address, and principal 
place of business of any entity that contributes over $5,000 toward his or 
her lobbying activities in a three-month period and that actively 
participates in the planning, oversight, or control of these activities.250  
Further, the registrant would need to file quarterly reports containing, 
among other things, the registrant’s and client’s names,251 a list of specific 
                                                                                                                          
244 Professors Luneburg and Susman, writing in 2006, suggested that a threshold of between 
$25,000 and $50,000 in income earned or amounts spent would account for the most substantial 
Astroturfing.  Luneburg & Susman, supra note 151, at 45.  Since the federal lobbying laws in effect in 
2006 required semiannual instead of quarterly reporting, Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995 § 5(a), 2 
U.S.C. § 1604(a) (2006), their suggestion would imply (potentially) that paid lobbyists receiving or 
spending more than $50,000 total in a calendar year could trigger disclosure.  The Shays-Meehan 
proposal, on the other hand, called for disclosure only where income or expenditures surpass $100,000 
quarterly.  H.R. 2093, 110th Cong. § 1(b)(2)(A)(iii) (2007).  Such a threshold might be too generous, as 
lobbyists orchestrating Astroturf activities could theoretically raise or spend $400,000 annually and still 
evade disclosure under this scheme. 
245 Honest Leadership and Open Government Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-81, § 201(a)(1)(A), 
2007 U.S.C.C.A.N. (121 Stat.) 735, 741 (to be codified at 2 U.S.C. § 1604(a)). 
246 S. 1, § 220(a)(2). 
247 Id. § 220(b)(1) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
248 § 201(b)(5)(A)–(B), 2007 U.S.C.C.A.N. (121 Stat.) at 742 (to be codified at 2 U.S.C. § 
1603(a)(3)(A)).  
249 2 U.S.C. § 1603(b)(1)–(2).  
250 § 207(a)(1)(A)–(B), 2007 U.S.C.C.A.N. (121 Stat.) at 747 (to be codified at 2 U.S.C. §§ 
1603(b)(3)(A)–(B)). 
251 Id. § 201(a)(1)(A) (to be codified at 2 U.S.C. § 1604(a)). 
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issues and bills on which the registrant encouraged citizens to lobby,252 and 
good faith estimates of income or expenses relating to paid efforts to 
stimulate grassroots lobbying where such amounts surpass $25,000.253  The 
contents of the registration and reports would thereafter be made publicly 
available.254 
Most individual citizens would probably not meet the disclosure 
thresholds, and few, if any, would meet the aforementioned direct lobbying 
income or expenditures floors.  The provisions would thus apply primarily 
to organizations and wealthy individuals, but the information sought would 
appear to withstand constitutional muster.  As McIntyre v. Ohio Elections 
Commission255 suggests, disclosure of financial information would not be 
especially burdensome to registrants because it would not directly reveal 
substantial information about their identities.256  Nor would it serve, as 
McConnell v. FEC257 would suggest, as an outright prohibition on the 
ability to lobby and advocate.258 
This is not to say, however, that revelation of the identities of parties 
amenable to the above provisions is unlawful.  Granted, McIntyre suggests 
that divulging the identity of a private citizen acting alone, where the 
citizen’s activity is more or less pure speech, would ultimately provide 
information that would be of little use in political discourse.259  Yet, 
without going into much detail, the Court noted that “larger circumstances” 
may require disclosure of the speaker’s identity.260  Applying this rationale 
to the lobbying context, where a compelling interest exists as to the 
exposure and control of Astroturfing, Congress appeared to have acted 
within its powers in requiring disclosure of the identities of parties who 
orchestrate or support artificial grassroots efforts.  Harriss intimates that 
Congress has the right, with regard to lobbying activities, to ask “who is 
being hired, who is putting up the money, and how much.”261  McConnell 
furthers this notion and suggests that Congress can require identity 
disclosure because it will provide the public with meaningful information 
                                                                                                                          
252 2 U.S.C. § 1604(b)(2). 
253 Id. § 1604(c); S. 1, 110th Cong. § 220(d)(1) (2007).   
254 See 2 U.S.C. § 1605(4) (stating that registrations and reports will be “[made] available for 
public inspection and copying”). 
255 514 U.S. 334 (1995). 
256 See id. at 355 (concluding that disclosure of expenditures and their uses reveals far less 
information than does disclosure of a name or identity).  
257 540 U.S. 93 (2003). 
258 See id. at 201 (agreeing with the District Court that BCRA’s disclosure requirements did not 
prevent any persons or groups from speaking). 
259 See McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 348–49 (“[I]n the case of a handbill written by a private citizen who 
is not known to the recipient, the name and address of the author add little, if anything, to the reader’s 
ability to evaluate the document’s message.”). 
260 Id. at 358 (Ginsburg, J., concurring); see also Fitzpatrick & Palenchar, supra note 14, at 219 
(suggesting that “corporate participation in an alleged grassroots effort to sway public policy” would be 
a circumstance for which the interest in identity disclosure is greater).  
261 United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 625 (1954). 
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with which to evaluate Astroturf campaigns. 
4.  Penalties for Noncompliance 
The amended Lobbying Disclosure Act increased the penalties for 
failure to comply with lobbying disclosure requirements.  Under the former 
system, lobbyists who knowingly failed to abide by the federal disclosure 
provisions would be subject to a fine of upwards of $50,000.262  The 
amended statute, however, raises the potential fine to $200,000 and 
stipulates that anyone who “knowingly and corruptly” fails to meet 
disclosure demands will incur a prison sentence of as much as five years.263  
Had the Senate bill become law, the new sanctions for noncompliance 
would have applied to direct lobbying activities and to paid attempts to 
stimulate grassroots lobbying.   
Criminalizing deliberate failure to comply with disclosure orders, in 
regard to the proposed grassroots lobbying laws, could pose constitutional 
problems.  Since FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life264 invalidated  
BCRA’s criminal treatment of issue-advocate-sponsored electioneering 
communications, the argument follows that similar rules in the context of 
grassroots lobbying would amount to regulation of issue advocacy, which 
would not be the least restrictive means of addressing Astroturfing.265  
Thus, if the suggested thresholds for disclosure of paid efforts to stimulate 
grassroots lobbying were to capture true issue advocates, then the criminal 
sanctions provision for failure to comply with these demands may not be 
lawful—indeed, Broadrick v. Oklahoma266 may suggest that the statute 
would fail to regulate in a “noncensorial” manner.267  But this would 
depend on whether the proposed legislation would have treated issue 
advocates as parties retained to engage in Astroturfing.  When combined 
with the other criteria for disclosure, it appears that the “retained by 
clients” requirement would have sufficiently distinguished parties who 
partake in genuine issue advocacy from those who imitate it.268  This point 
aside, the Supreme Court in Harriss upheld FRLA as applied to artificial 
                                                                                                                          
262 Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995 § 7, 2 U.S.C. § 1606 (2006). 
263 Honest Leadership and Open Government Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-81, § 211(a), 2007 
U.S.C.C.A.N. (121 Stat.) 735, 749 (to be codified at 2 U.S.C. § 1606). 
264 551 U.S. 449 (2007). 
265 See Sekulow & Zimmerman, supra note 1, at 176 (arguing that Wisconsin Right to Life 
establishes that the regulation of grassroots issue advocacy is not a narrowly-tailored means of attaining 
a compelling governmental interest). 
266 413 U.S. 601 (1973). 
267 Id. at 614–15 (“[O]verbreadth scrutiny has generally been somewhat less rigid in the context of 
statutes regulating conduct in the shadow of the First Amendment, but doing so in a neutral, 
noncensorial manner.” (citations omitted)). 
268 See Press Release, OMB Watch, Opponents of Grassroots Lobbying Disclosure Are Wrong 
About Impact on Nonprofits (Jan. 12, 2007), http://www.ombwatch.org/print/3138 (arguing that the 
disclosure provisions of the Lobbying Transparency and Accountability Act would strictly apply to 
“lobby firms, advertisers and lobbyists that exceed significant dollar thresholds”). 
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issue advocacy without voiding the Act’s criminal sanctions for failure to 
comply with disclosure orders.269  Furthermore, the court in Commission 
on Independent Colleges & Universities v. New York Temporary State 
Commission on Regulation of Lobbying270 a similar statute criminalizing 
“wilful” failure to disclose certain indirect lobbying activities, finding that 
the law’s definition of “lobbying” did not extend mandatory disclosure to 
“any remote indirect activity to influence legislation.”271    
B.  Additional Matters for Consideration 
1.  Role of Ethics 
With no federal grassroots lobbying laws in place, the primary 
responsibility for addressing the influence of special interests in the 
lobbying process resides with the public relations industry and lobbyists 
themselves.272  Accomplishment of this task hence depends on the ability 
of lobbyists and lobbying firms to check the actions of one another.  Even 
though public relations societies and lobbying leagues have incorporated 
into their codes of ethics provisions discouraging their members from 
adopting the tactics of issue advocates, such codes do not proscribe 
Astroturfing, and any adherence to them is voluntary.  The lack of power 
to compel organization members to abstain from artificial grassroots 
advocacy thus makes achieving compliance virtually impossible.273 
Neither house of Congress gave much consideration to the ethical 
dimension of grassroots lobbying legislation.  A possible addition to the 
Senate proposal would have been a section outlining the expected conduct 
of professional lobbyists—which would more or less borrow from present 
codes of lobbying and public relations ethics—advising lobbyists that they 
should not resort to Astroturf lobbying in order to further the interests of 
clients.  The Senate could then have specified that failure to abide by these 
guidelines will result in expulsion from any organized lobbying groups of 
which violators are members, as well as a ban on joining any such 
associations.  A provision like this would make the lobbying industry’s 
task of identifying and dealing with parties that participate in deceptive 
activities more efficient, as the industry would now have a statutory 
backstop for assistance, and would encourage greater self-auditing by 
                                                                                                                          
269 The Court specifically stated that, if the criminal prohibition in FRLA were to be found 
unconstitutional, the statute’s civil penalties could still stand, but it did not declare the prohibition 
unlawful.  United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 627 (1954). 
270 534 F. Supp. 489 (N.D.N.Y. 1982). 
271 Id. at 492, 502. 
272 Fitzpatrick & Palenchar, supra note 14, at 220. 
273 See RICHARD W. PAINTER, GETTING THE GOVERNMENT AMERICA DESERVES 196 (2009) (“[I]t 
is probable that for lobbyists . . . self-regulation without any government supervision will not work.”). 
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lobbyists whose activities may represent pseudo-grassroots lobbying.274  
Such a provision may, however, arouse overbreadth concerns, making it 
necessary to incorporate into future grassroots lobbying legislation a 
concise definition of “professional lobbyist.” 
A more severe measure than the above suggestion would be criminal 
punishment.  This option would essentially do away with much of the 
Senate’s proposed disclosure requirements.  Yet, since criminalization 
would operate as a total prohibition on the ability of certain parties to 
lobby the government, there is a reasonable probability that it would not be 
constitutional.  The Supreme Court has not formally recognized a 
constitutional right to lobby, but it has suggested that lobbying activities 
involve, to some degree, freedom of petition.275  And while the Court has 
not specifically extended this finding to Astroturfing, the right of petition 
for lobbyists, at present, would most likely cover Astroturfing because 
such activity nevertheless is a form of lobbying.276  It would seem that a 
provision prohibiting artificial grassroots advocacy altogether, even if 
steeped in ethical considerations, would violate the First Amendment as it 
pertains to lobbyists,277 despite the government’s compelling interest in 
addressing the practice.   
A monetary fine for creating false grassroots campaigns, on the other 
hand, would not operate as a criminal bar against lobbying activities, and 
lobbyists would still have the right to lobby directly on behalf of clients.  
To foster cooperation with the guidelines on the ethical conduct 
recommended above, the Senate could have devised a system of fines 
corresponding percentage-wise with the amount a lobbyist spends on or 
receives for Astroturf lobbying, set at a level sufficient to cause lobbyists 
to reconsider plans to deceive the public and elected officials.  In fact, to 
                                                                                                                          
274 Even without a provision like this, lobbyists should scrutinize their activities to ensure that 
they are not engaging in conduct that may constitute Astroturfing.  Fitzpatrick & Palenchar, supra note 
14, at 222. 
275 See E. R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 138 (1961) 
(“The right of petition is one of the freedoms protected by the Bill of Rights . . . .  [T]he Sherman Act 
does not apply to the activities of the railroads . . . insofar as those activities comprised mere 
solicitation of governmental action with respect to the passage and enforcement of laws.”).  The 
decision in Noerr may stand for the proposition that Congress cannot address Astroturfing by treating it 
as a felony or misdemeanor, but the case deals with the reach of an antitrust statute, not the scope of a 
lobbying law.  Moreover, Noerr does not suggest that Harriss was wrong as to Congress’s right to seek 
disclosure of artificially stimulated letter campaigns.    
276 See Luneburg & Spitzer, supra note 48, at 57 (finding that an “‘artificially stimulated letter 
campaign,’” being a “‘direct’” communication with elected officials, is a type of lobbying (quoting 
United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 620 (1954))); Thomas, supra note 85, at 185 (arguing that 
lobbying, “even in its most distasteful forms, has always been a popular means of petitioning American 
government officials,” and that the Founders likely deemed lobbying worthy of First Amendment, right 
of petition defense). 
277 See Thomas, supra note 85, at 186–87 (“Any court applying an original intent analysis of the 
right of petition would be forced to declare . . . statutes [prohibiting lobbying activities] 
unconstitutional, as violative of the First Amendment right of petition . . . .”). 
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account for resource inequalities, the Senate should have used a similar 
method in setting the current civil penalty for failure to comply with the 
revised Lobbying Disclosure Act instead of a fixed quantity of $200,000.278 
2.  “Size-of-Contribution-Only” Requirement for Disclosure of 
Contributors  
Another matter involves simplification of the standards for disclosure 
of contributors to Astroturf campaigns.  Had the provisions regarding paid 
efforts to stimulate grassroots lobbying become law, parties that engage in 
Astroturfing would have needed to divulge the names and contact 
information of organizations that, in addition to contributing at least $5,000 
to these causes, “actively [participate] in [their] planning, supervision or 
control.”279  Yet the Senate included no standard in the proposal, and no 
standard presently exists, for deducing whether a contributor to Astroturf 
efforts qualifies as an active participant.  One way to address this matter 
would be to classify as active participants parties whose time and money 
devoted to an Astroturf campaign exceed a certain proportion of the total 
time and money they contribute to lobbying efforts in general in a calendar 
year.280  But difficulties in accurately quantifying the amount of time and 
money a party spends on each lobbying activity it undertakes would 
complicate this idea. 
A better approach would have been to eliminate the requirement that 
the contributing party substantially involve itself in formulating, 
overseeing or managing an Astroturf movement—and thus institute a 
“size-of-contribution-only” standard, where parties would only need to 
contribute above a certain quantity to trigger disclosure.  The $5,000 
contribution threshold carries with it the implied notion that persons and 
groups that direct substantial funds toward artificial grassroots activities 
probably play, or would like to play, an active role in seeing that these 
activities accomplish their objectives.  McConnell may support a “size-of-
contribution-only” standard for contributors to Astroturf lobbying.  While 
the disclosure mandate that McConnell upheld involved electioneering 
communications and not grassroots lobbying, that provision nevertheless 
                                                                                                                          
278 As Professor Krishnakumar observes, a set penalty represents a mere “drop in the bucket” for 
numerous lobbyists and special interests, and would be “far less effective than . . . fines based on a 
percentage of lobbying income or lobbying expenditures.”  Krishnakumar, supra note 17, at 556–57.   
279 Honest Leadership and Open Government Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-81, § 207(a)(1), 2007 
U.S.C.C.A.N. (121 Stat.) 735, 747 (to be codified at 2 U.S.C. § 1603(b)(3)).  Despite the absence of the 
grassroots lobbying provisions in the final version of the Lobbying Transparency and Accountability 
Act, the $5,000 contributor-disclosure threshold remained in place and currently applies to lobbying in 
general.  Id. 
280 Current lobbying laws seem to employ a similar method in defining “lobbyist,” classifying as 
not a lobbyist an individual “whose lobbying activities constitute less than [twenty] percent of the time 
engaged in the services provided by such individual to [a given client] over a [three]-month period.”   
§ 201(b)(1), 2007 U.S.C.C.A.N. (121 Stat.) at 742 (to be codified at 2 U.S.C. § 1602(10)). 
 2010] ARTIFICIAL GRASSROOTS ADVOCACY 399 
required disclosure only after contributions exceeded a specified amount; it 
did not further require that the contributor actively partake in planning or 
directing the communication.281   
Congress should also consider several other matters with respect to the 
disclosure of individuals and organizations that contribute to Astroturfing.  
First, regardless of whether Congress were to employ a “size-of-
contribution-only” standard in drafting grassroots lobbying legislation, it 
should at least clarify that the $5,000 threshold refers to total, not 
individual, contributions—or else certain parties could avoid disclosure by 
repeatedly contributing less than $5,000.  Further, the statute could require 
disclosure of each individual contribution once a party exceeds $5,000 in 
net donated funds so that citizens may gauge which parties contribute most 
substantially to Astroturf campaigns.   
3.  Extending Accountability to Clients 
Finally, grassroots lobbying legislation should hold clients accountable 
for Astroturfing, an area on which the Honest Leadership and Open 
Government Act and the grassroots lobbying proposals placed little to no 
emphasis.  This may be attributable to the fact that, oftentimes, lobbyists 
have discretion over which forms of lobbying they will employ and the 
intensity of their lobbying efforts.282  Nevertheless, in many cases 
individuals and organizations contact lobbyists or public relations firms 
with the aim of having an Astroturf campaign initiated on their behalf.283  
Such clients authorize lobbyists to engage in activity which the 
government has a compelling interest in addressing.  Because lobbyists 
compensated to generate Astroturf campaigns act as agents for their 
clients, grassroots lobbying legislation should contain provisions outlining 
the consequences of this conduct for those clients who express interest in 
such campaigns. 
The best means of holding clients accountable for the actions of hired 
lobbyists appears to be through an extension of the suggested fine on 
lobbyists to clients.  For clients who intentionally seek lobbyists for 
Astroturf campaigns, the same recommended fine—a percentage of total 
income from or expenses for lobbying services large enough to deter 
artificial grassroots advocacy—could apply.  For clients who do not intend 
for hired lobbyists to pursue efforts to stimulate grassroots activity, a 
smaller percentage fine could apply.  A sizable fine would discourage 
clients from offering to pay lobbyists to generate inauthentic issue 
                                                                                                                          
281 Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 § 201(a), 2 U.S.C. § 434(f)(1) (2006). 
282 Jonathan S. Masur & Jonathan Remy Nash, The Institutional Dynamics of Transition Relief, 85 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 391, 413–14 n.81 (2010). 
283 See Krishnakumar, supra note 17, at 565 (describing astroturf lobbyists as “hired guns”); Bass, 
supra note 21 (suggesting that Astroturfing amounts to “hired-gun grass-roots lobbying”). 
 400 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 43:357 
advocacy.  Furthermore, it may persuade lobbyists to employ traditional 
direct lobbying practices rather than grassroots strategies to fulfill the goals 
of their clients, if they want to retain the business of these entities and 
prevent possible damage to their reputations and those of their clients.  
Again, a criminal penalty does not appear workable because it may 
function as an outright prohibition of lobbying activities (albeit in a more 
indirect fashion in this case), possibly raising fears about the ability of 
lobbyists to adequately exercise their right of petition.  Similarly, given 
this concern, it would be inequitable to criminally punish clients but not 
the parties that perform the actual Astroturfing.   
V.  CONCLUSION 
Astroturf lobbying has grown in popularity over the years and has 
proven effective at swaying public opinion on matters of political 
significance.  Despite its questionable features, special interest groups, 
corporations, affluent individuals, and lobbyists will not be quick to 
abandon the practice anytime soon.  Perhaps the most obvious reason for 
this is congressional failure to implement legislation which will bring 
artificial grassroots advocacy to light, even though the Supreme Court and 
lower courts have noted that there is a compelling governmental interest in 
the exposure and control of this activity.  Legislation critics understandably 
fear that statutory efforts to identify fake grassroots activities will constrain 
the ability of genuine issue advocates to fully exercise their First 
Amendment rights.  Yet case law on state-level efforts to address Astroturf 
lobbying, as well as Supreme Court findings in the context of election-
based speech, demonstrate that these fears are inflated or unfounded, and 
that federal legislation would promote diverse and fully-informed public 
discourse on the issues of the day. 
That Congress has introduced grassroots lobbying bills in recent years, 
even if these proposals have not resulted in binding laws, is encouraging.  
But whether it will consider potential legislation again in the near future is 
unclear.  If and when it does, it may look to some of the standards from 
and mandates of the 2007 proposals for guidance.  It should also give 
serious thought to ethical guidelines for lobbyist conduct, percentage-based 
fines for engagement in Astroturfing, and means of holding parties that 
request Astroturf campaigns accountable for their decisions.  In any event, 
the continuing prevalence of Astroturfing in modern lobbying shows that 
the time is right for Congress to not only grapple with the matter again, but 
to approach it with a greater commitment to meaningful reform. 
